Who fares better in teamwork?

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Yildirim, Huseyin
• 署名单位: Duke University
• 刊物名称: RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0741-6261
• DOI: 10.1111/1756-2171.12438
• 发表日期: 2023
• 页码: 299-324
• 关键词: dynamic private provision; incentives; TRANSPARENCY; projects; teams

摘要

This article establishes a tenuous link between ability and relative well-being in teamwork. It shows that higher-ability or lower-cost members can easily fare worse than their lower-ability counterparts due to free-riding. The extent of free-riding hinges crucially on log-concavity of effort cost, which its convexity restricts little. The article further shows how to compose teams that allocate effort efficiently and equalize payoffs in equilibrium. Efficient teams must have sufficiently diverse abilities and sizes at most the number of cost log-inflections plus one. These findings can explain the evidence of a significant dislike for teamwork in the workplace and classroom.