Storing power: market structure matters

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Andres-Cerezo, David; Fabra, Natalia
• 署名单位: Universidad Carlos III de Madrid; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK
• 刊物名称: RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0741-6261
• DOI: 10.1111/1756-2171.12429
• 发表日期: 2023
• 页码: 3-53
• 关键词: electricity; storage; COMPETITION; ECONOMICS

摘要

We assess how firms' incentives to operate and invest in energy storage depend on the market structure. For this purpose, we characterize equilibrium market outcomes allowing for market power in storage and/or production, as well as for vertical integration between storage and production. Market power reduces overall efficiency through two channels: It induces an inefficient use of the storage facilities, and it distorts investment incentives. The worst outcome for consumers and total welfare occurs under vertical integration. The results are key to understanding how to regulate energy storage, an issue which is critical for the deployment of renewable energies.