Customer poaching and brand switching

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Fudenberg, D; Tirole, J
• 署名单位: Harvard University; Universite de Toulouse; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
• 刊物名称: RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0741-6261
• DOI: 10.2307/2696352
• 发表日期: 2000
• 页码: 634-657
• 关键词: Contract

摘要

Firms sometimes try to poach the customers of their competitors by offering them inducements to switch. We analyze duopoly poaching under both short-term and longterm contracts assuming either that each consumer's brand preferences are fixed over rime or that preferences are independent over time. With fixed preferences, short-term contracts lead to poaching and socially inefficient switching. The equilibrium with long-term contracts has less switching than when only short-term contracts are feasible, and it involves the sale of both short-term and long-term contracts. With independent preferences, short-term contracts are efficient, but long-term contracts lead to inefficiently little switching.