Investment and market dominance

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Athey, S; Schmutzler, A
• 署名单位: Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); National Bureau of Economic Research; University of Zurich
• 刊物名称: RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0741-6261
• DOI: 10.2307/2696395
• 发表日期: 2001
• 页码: 1-26
• 关键词: strategic complementarities; Nash equilibrium; COMPETITION; product; games; INNOVATION; oligopoly; EVOLUTION; duopoly; POLICY

摘要

We analyze a model of oligopolistic competition with ongoing investment. Special cases include incremental investment, parent races, learning by doing, and network externalities, We investigate circumstances under which a firm with low costs or high quality will extend its initial lead through investments, To this end, we derive a new comparative statics result for general games with strategic substitutes, which applies to our investment game. Finally, we highlight plausible countervailing effects that arise when investments of leaders are less effective than those of laggards, or in dynamic games when firms are sufficiently patient.