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作者：KIM, J
摘要：I develop a two-period model of entry deterrence with endogenous market demands such that the consumer's expectation about the future market structure is fulfilled in equilibrium. I find that both expectations (duopoly and monopoly) are fulfilled in the (incumbent's) price-setting game, while there is a unique equilibrium in the quantity-setting game. I also find that ''quantity'' is more entry-deterring than ''price'' in the sense that the maximum value of the entry cost that allows entry in ...
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作者：BIGLAISER, G
摘要：I show that a middleman can be welfare improving in all equilibria in a quite general bargaining model when adverse selection is present. Conditions are determined for when a middleman is most likely to be in a market. Examples of the theory are also provided.
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作者：FRIEDMAN, JW; THISSE, JF
作者单位：University of North Carolina; University of North Carolina Chapel Hill; Sorbonne Universite
摘要：We investigate a spatial duopoly in which the firms simultaneously select locations at the beginning of time; once chosen, the locations are fixed forever, but the firms will choose prices in each of a countably infinite succession of time periods. We are interested in equilibrium behavior when the firms will collusively arrange a trigger strategy equilibrium in prices, and will select their locations knowing that a particular such trigger strategy price equilibrium will ensue. Specifically, w...
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作者：BROWN, C
作者单位：National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：The traditional literature on method of pay distinguishes workers who are paid time rates from those who are paid piece rates. The theory predicts that the piece-rate workers will earn more, and empirically they do. A simple generalization is to divide time-rate workers into two groups: those whose wage depends on their supervisor's ratings and those whose wage does not. Theory predicts that the workers whose pay is linked to supervisor ratings will earn more than the other time-rate workers. ...
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作者：PINT, EM
作者单位：University of Oxford; RAND Corporation
摘要：A stochastic-cost model is used to show that both price-cap and rate-of-return regulation lead to overinvestment in capital and to excessive managerial slack. However, they differ in stochastic versus fixed intervals between hearings and in the use of test-year costs versus average costs since the previous hearing. A numerical example illustrates that fixed intervals between hearings improve welfare if hearings are not held too frequently, but most gains go to the firm. More significantly, the...
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作者：DRANOVE, D; SHANLEY, M; SIMON, C
作者单位：University of Chicago
摘要：Recent attention has been given to the hypothesis that local hospital competition takes the form of costly duplication of specialized services-the medical arms race. This contrasts with the hypothesis that the supply of specialized services is determined solely by the extent of the market. We develop a model predicting the provision of specialized services in local markets. Our analysis of California hospitals provides minimal support for the medical arms race hypothesis while suggesting subs...
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作者：ARMSTRONG, M; VICKERS, J
摘要：Should a multiproduct monopolist whose average price is capped by regulation be allowed to engage in (third-degree) price discrimination? If the cap applies to a price index with weights proportional to demands at uniform prices, then price discrimination benefits consumers as well as the firm. But if-perhaps more realistically-it is the firm's average revenue that is capped, then consumers prefer uniform pricing. In this case total output is higher when discrimination is allowed, which increa...
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作者：HADFIELD, GK
摘要：The analysis of strategic behavior frequently revolves around the problem of identifying commitment technologies that credibly expand strategic opportunities. This article revisits the question of spatial preemption to investigate the potential for organizational form to serve as a commitment technology in the effort to deter entry. The analysis demonstrates first that delegation of pricing authority to independent outlet operators through a franchise contract can deter entry. Moreover, this d...
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作者：ANDREONI, J
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作者：BAGWELL, K; RAMEY, G
作者单位：University of California System; University of California San Diego
