On the optimality of the patent renewal system
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Scotchmer, S
署名单位：
University of California System; University of California Berkeley
刊物名称：
RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
ISSN/ISSBN：
0741-6261
DOI：
10.2307/2556076
发表日期：
1999
页码：
181-196
关键词：
摘要：
The patent system is mainly a renewal system: the patent life is chosen by the patentee in return for fees. I ask whether such a system cart be justified by asymmetric information on costs and benefits of research. In such a model I show that renewal mechanisms (possibly with subsidies) are equivalent to direct revelation mechanisms and therefore cannot be improved on, regardless of the objective function. Under plausible circumstances, patents should have a uniform life, rather than varying in length, as typically occurs under a renewal system.
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