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作者：Ozerturk, Saltuk
作者单位：Southern Methodist University
摘要：This article analyzes the provision of information acquisition and truthful reporting incentives to a financial analyst who can privately trade on own account. In a binary message and state space, I show that the analyst reward scheme essentially provides him with a portfolio endowment traded in the market. Regardless of the true signal, the analyst issues the report that corresponds to the portfolio endowment with maximum market value, given security prices. The analyst information acquisitio...
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作者：Anderson, Axel; Cabral, Luis M. B.
作者单位：Georgetown University; New York University
摘要：We consider a differential game in which the joint choices of the two players influence the variance, but not the mean, of the one-dimensional state variable. We show that a pure strategy perfect equilibrium in stationary Markov strategies (ME) exists and has the property that patient players choose to play it safe when sufficiently ahead and to take risks when sufficiently behind. We also provide a simple condition that implies both players choose risky strategies when neither one is too far ...
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作者：Doraszelski, Ulrich; Markovich, Sarit
作者单位：Harvard University; Tel Aviv University
摘要：Can advertising lead to a sustainable competitive advantage? To answer this question, we propose a dynamic model of advertising competition where firms repeatedly advertise, compete in the product market, and make entry as well as exit decisions. Within this dynamic framework, we study two different models of advertising: in the first model, advertising influences the goodwill consumers extend toward a firm (goodwill advertising'), whereas in the second model it influences the share of consume...
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作者：Iizuka, Toshiaki
作者单位：Aoyama Gakuin University
摘要：This article examines the physician-patient agency relationship in the context of the prescription drug market in Japan. In this market, physicians often both prescribe and dispense drugs and can pocket profits in so doing. A concern is that, due to the incentive created by the markup, physicians' prescription decisions may be distorted. Empirical results using anti-hypertensive drugs suggest that physicians' prescription choices are influenced by the markup. However physicians are also sensit...
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作者：Esteban, Susanna; Shum, Matthew
作者单位：Universidad Carlos III de Madrid; Johns Hopkins University
摘要：We study the effects of durability and secondary markets on equilibrium firm behavior in the car market. We construct a dynamic oligopoly model of a differentiated product market to incorporate the equilibrium production dynamics that arise from the durability of the goods and their active trade in secondary markets. We derive an econometric model and estimate its parameters using data from the automobile industry over a 20-year period. Our estimates are used to provide a measure of the compet...
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作者：Biglaiser, Gary; Ma, Ching-to Albert
作者单位：University of North Carolina; University of North Carolina Chapel Hill; Boston University
摘要：We study job incentives in moonlighting, when public-service physicians may refer patients to their private practices. Some doctors in the public system are dedicated, and behave sincerely, but others-the moonlighters-are utility maximizers. Allowing moonlighting always enhances aggregate consumer welfare, but equilibrium public-care quality may increase or decrease; if quality increases, moonlighting improves each consumer's expected utility. Unregulated moonlighting may reduce consumer welfa...
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作者：Chiao, Benjamin; Lerner, Josh; Tirole, Jean
作者单位：University of Michigan System; University of Michigan; Harvard University; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：This article empirically explores standard-setting organizations' policy choices. Consistent with our earlier theoretical work, we find (i) a negative relationship between the extent to which an SSO is oriented to technology sponsors and the concession level required of sponsors and (ii) a positive correlation between the sponsor friendliness of the selected SSO and the quality of the standard. We also develop and test two extensions of the earlier model: the presence of provisions mandating r...
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作者：Pagnozzi, Marco
作者单位：University of Naples Federico II
摘要：A losing bidder can still purchase the prize from the winner after the auction. We show why a strong bidder may prefer to drop out of the auction before the price has reached her valuation and acquire the prize in the aftermarket: a strong bidder may be in a better bargaining position in the aftermarket if her rival won at a relatively low price. So it can be common knowledge that, in equilibrium, a weak bidder will win the auction and, even without uncertainty about relative valuations, resal...
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作者：Crocker, Keith J.; Slemrod, Joel
作者单位：Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park; University of Michigan System; University of Michigan
摘要：This article examines managerial compensation in an environment where managers may take a hidden action that affects the actual earnings of the firm. When realized, these earnings constitute hidden information that is privately observed by the manager who may expend resources to generate an inflated earnings report. We characterize the optimal managerial compensation contract in this setting, and demonstrate that contracts contingent on reported earnings cannot provide managers with the incent...
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作者：Chen, Yongmin; Riordan, Michael H.
作者单位：University of Colorado System; University of Colorado Boulder; Columbia University
摘要：This article uncovers an unnoticed connection between exclusive contracts and vertical organization. A vertically integrated firm can use exclusive dealing to foreclose an equally efficient upstream competitor and to cartelize the downstream industry. Neither vertical integration nor exclusive dealing alone achieves these anticompetitive effects. The cartelization effect of these two practices may be limited when downstream firms are heterogeneous and supply contracts are not contingent on unc...
