Experts' agency problems: evidence from the prescription drug market in Japan

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Iizuka, Toshiaki
• 署名单位: Aoyama Gakuin University
• 刊物名称: RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0741-6261
• 发表日期: 2007
• 页码: 844-862
• 关键词: physician; demand; reimbursement; COMPETITION; inducement; services; BEHAVIOR; models

摘要

This article examines the physician-patient agency relationship in the context of the prescription drug market in Japan. In this market, physicians often both prescribe and dispense drugs and can pocket profits in so doing. A concern is that, due to the incentive created by the markup, physicians' prescription decisions may be distorted. Empirical results using anti-hypertensive drugs suggest that physicians' prescription choices are influenced by the markup. However physicians are also sensitive to the patient out-of-pocket costs. Overall, although the markup affects prescription choices, physicians appear more responsive to the patient out-of-pocket costs than their own profits from markup.