Vertical integration, exclusive dealing, and ex post cartelization

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Chen, Yongmin; Riordan, Michael H.
• 署名单位: University of Colorado System; University of Colorado Boulder; Columbia University
• 刊物名称: RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0741-6261
• DOI: 10.1111/j.1756-2171.2007.tb00041.x
• 发表日期: 2007
• 页码: 1-21
• 关键词: monopolistic competition; naked exclusion; foreclosure; equilibrium; CONTRACTS; chamberlin; spirit

摘要

This article uncovers an unnoticed connection between exclusive contracts and vertical organization. A vertically integrated firm can use exclusive dealing to foreclose an equally efficient upstream competitor and to cartelize the downstream industry. Neither vertical integration nor exclusive dealing alone achieves these anticompetitive effects. The cartelization effect of these two practices may be limited when downstream firms are heterogeneous and supply contracts are not contingent on uncertain market conditions. The extent of cartelization also depends on the degree of downstream market concentration and on the degree to which downstream competition is localized.