Bidding to lose? Auctions with resale

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Pagnozzi, Marco
• 署名单位: University of Naples Federico II
• 刊物名称: RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0741-6261
• DOI: 10.1111/j.0741-6261.2007.00127.x
• 发表日期: 2007
• 页码: 1090-1112
• 关键词: standard auctions; MARKETS; price; MODEL

摘要

A losing bidder can still purchase the prize from the winner after the auction. We show why a strong bidder may prefer to drop out of the auction before the price has reached her valuation and acquire the prize in the aftermarket: a strong bidder may be in a better bargaining position in the aftermarket if her rival won at a relatively low price. So it can be common knowledge that, in equilibrium, a weak bidder will win the auction and, even without uncertainty about relative valuations, resale will take place. The possibility of reselling to a strong bidder attracts weak bidders to participate in the auction and raises the seller's revenue.