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作者：Holmes, Thomas J.; Mitchell, Matthew F.
作者单位：Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Minneapolis; University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities; National Bureau of Economic Research; University of Toronto
摘要：This article develops a theory of how capital, skilled labor, and unskilled labor interact at the plant level. The theory has implications for the relationship between factor allocation and plant size and the effects of trade and growth on the skill premium. The theory is consistent with certain facts about factor allocation and factor price changes in the 19th and 20th centuries.
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作者：Che, Yeon-Koo; Spier, Kathryn E.
作者单位：Columbia University; Harvard University
摘要：A liquidity-constrained entrepreneur raises capital to finance a business activity that may harm bystanders. The entrepreneur raises senior (secured) debt to shield assets from the tort victims in bankruptcy. For a fixed level of borrowing, senior debt creates better incentives for precaution taking than either junior debt or outside equity. The entrepreneur's level of borrowing is, however, socially excessive. Giving tort victims priority over senior debtholders in bankruptcy prevents overlev...
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作者：Daughety, Andrew F.; Reinganum, Jennifer F.
作者单位：Vanderbilt University
摘要：We examine the interplay of imperfect competition and incomplete information in the context of price competition among firms producing horizontally and vertically differentiated substitute products. Incomplete information about vertical quality (consumer satisfaction) signalled via price softens price competition. Low-quality firms always prefer the incomplete information game to the full-information analog. Moreover, for high-value markets with a sufficiently high proportion of high-quality f...
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作者：Severinov, Sergei
作者单位：University of Essex
摘要：The article addresses the issue of optimal organization of production. I compare three organizational forms: centralization (one agent produces different inputs), decentralization (each of two agents produces a different input and contracts directly with the principal), and delegation (two agents produce different inputs, the principal contracts with one of them only). The optimal organizational form depends on the degree of complementarity/substitutability between the inputs in the final use....
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作者：Marino, Anthony M.; Zabojnik, Jan
作者单位：University of Southern California; Queens University - Canada
摘要：Work-related perks, such as corporate jets, nice offices, and so forth, improve the tradeoff between incentives and insurance that determines the optimal incentive contract. We show that (i) such perks may be offered even if their direct consumption benefits are offset by their costs; (ii) they will be offered for free; (iii) agents in more uncertain production environments will receive more perks; (iv) senior executives should receive more perks; and (v) better corporate governance can lead t...
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作者：de Frutos, Maria-Angeles; Kittsteiner, Thomas
作者单位：Universidad Carlos III de Madrid; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
摘要：Buy-sell clauses are commonly used contractual provisions to determine the terms of dissolution of partnerships. Under them, one party offers a price for the partnership and the other party chooses whether to sell her share or buy her partner's share at this price. We point out that the selection of the proposing partner is essential for the performance of the clause. Moreover, if partners negotiate for the advantage of being the chooser, then buy-sell clauses result in an ex post efficient ou...
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作者：Yehezkel, Yaron
作者单位：Tel Aviv University
摘要：This article considers vertical relations between an upstream manufacturer and a downstream retailer that can independently obtain a low-quality, discount substitute. The analysis reveals that under full information, the retailer offers both varieties if and only if it is optimal to do so under vertical integration. However, when the retailer is privately informed about demand, it offers both varieties even if under vertical integration it is profitable to offer only the manufacturer's product...
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作者：Hortacsu, Ali; Puller, Steven L.
作者单位：University of Chicago; National Bureau of Economic Research; Texas A&M University System; Texas A&M University College Station
摘要：We examine the bidding behavior of firms in the Texas electricity spot market, where bidders submit hourly supply schedules to sell power. We characterize an equilibrium model of bidding and use detailed firm-level data on bids and marginal costs to compare actual bidding behavior to theoretical benchmarks. Firms with large stakes in the market performed close to the theoretical benchmark of static profit maximization. However, smaller firms utilized excessively steep bid schedules significant...
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作者：Aghion, Philippe; Dewatripont, Mathias; Stein, Jeremy C.
作者单位：National Bureau of Economic Research; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR); Harvard University; Universite Libre de Bruxelles; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：We develop a model that clarifies the respective advantages and disadvantages of academic and private-sector research. Rather than relying on lack of appropriability or spillovers to generate a rationale for academic research, we emphasize control-rights considerations, and argue that the fundamental tradeoff between academia and the private sector is one of creative control versus focus. By serving as a precommitment mechanism that allows scientists to freely pursue their own interests, acade...
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作者：Harrington, Joseph E., Jr.; Skrzypacz, Andrzej
作者单位：Johns Hopkins University; Stanford University
摘要：Collusion under imperfect monitoring is explored whenfirms' prices are private information and their quantities are public information; such an information structure is consistent with several recent price-fixing cartels, such as those in lysine and vitamins. For a class of symmetric oligopoly games, it is shown that symmetric equilibrium punishments cannot sustain any collusion. An asymmetric punishment is characterized that does sustain collusion and it has firms whose sales exceed their quo...
