The rules of standard-setting organizations: an empirical analysis
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Chiao, Benjamin; Lerner, Josh; Tirole, Jean
署名单位：
University of Michigan System; University of Michigan; Harvard University; National Bureau of Economic Research
刊物名称：
RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
ISSN/ISSBN：
0741-6261
DOI：
10.1111/j.0741-6261.2007.00118.x
发表日期：
2007
页码：
905-930
关键词：
摘要：
This article empirically explores standard-setting organizations' policy choices. Consistent with our earlier theoretical work, we find (i) a negative relationship between the extent to which an SSO is oriented to technology sponsors and the concession level required of sponsors and (ii) a positive correlation between the sponsor friendliness of the selected SSO and the quality of the standard. We also develop and test two extensions of the earlier model: the presence of provisions mandating royalty-free licensing is negatively associated with disclosure requirements, and the relationship between concessions and user friendliness is weaker when there is only a limited number of SSOs.
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