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作者：Economides, Nicholas; Seim, Katja; Viard, V. Brian
作者单位：New York University; University of Pennsylvania
摘要：Local telecommunications competition was an important goal of the 1996 Telecommunications Act. We evaluate the consumer welfare effects of entry into residential local telephone service in New York State using household-level data from September 1999 to March 2003. We address the prevalence of nonlinear tariffs by developing a discrete/continuous demand model that allows for service bundling and unobservable provider quality. We find that the average subscriber to the entrants' services gains ...
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作者：Biais, Bruno; Perotti, Enrico
作者单位：Universite Federale Toulouse Midi-Pyrenees (ComUE); University of Amsterdam
摘要：We study how early-stage new ideas are turned into successful businesses. Even promising ideas can be unprofitable if they fail on one dimension, such as technical feasibility, correspondence to market demand, legality, or patentability. To screen good ideas, the entrepreneur needs to hire experts who evaluate the idea along their dimensions of expertise. Sharing the idea, however, creates the risk that the expert would steal it. Yet, the idea-thief cannot contact any other expert, lest he sho...
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作者：Caruana, Guillermo; Einav, Liran
作者单位：Stanford University; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：We analyze a dynamic model of quantity competition, where firms continuously adjust their quantity targets, but incur convex adjustment costs when they do so. Quantity targets serve as a partial commitment device and, in equilibrium, follow a hump-shaped pattern. The final equilibrium is more competitive than in the static analog. We then use data on monthly production targets of the Big Three U.S. auto manufacturers and show a similar empirical hump-shaped dynamic pattern. Taken together, thi...
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作者：Esponda, Ignacio
作者单位：New York University
摘要：I apply the notion of a self-confirming equilibrium (SCE) to study how feedback in first price auctions influences bidders' perceptions about their strategic environment, and consequently their bidding behavior. In a private values setting, revealing the two highest bids at the end of each auction is sufficient for bidders to have correct beliefs (justifying the assumption of Nash equilibrium). In contrast, in every symmetric SCE of a symmetric, affiliated, private values model, bidding strate...
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作者：Hossain, Tanjim
作者单位：Hong Kong University of Science & Technology
摘要：We analyze a dynamic second-price auction with an informed bidder and an uninformed bidder who, upon seeing a posted price, learns whether his valuation is above that price. In the essentially unique equilibrium, an informed bidder bids in the first period if her valuation is below some cutoff and bids only in the last period otherwise. An uninformed bidder bids in every period to optimally change the price unless the price is above his valuation or he is the high bidder. This model also provi...
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作者：Kirkegaard, Rene; Overgaard, Per Baltzer
作者单位：Brock University; Aarhus University
摘要：Online auction sites often enable sellers to add a buy-out price. In one-shot auctions, this has been motivated by appeal to impatience or risk aversion. We offer additional justification in a dynamic model, by showing that an early seller has an incentive to use a buy-out price, if a similar product is offered later by another seller, and bidders desire multiple objects. Revenue in the first auction increases, but revenue in the second auction decreases, as does the sum of revenues. The buy-o...
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作者：Cohen, Chen; Kaplan, Todd R.; Sela, Aner
作者单位：Ben-Gurion University of the Negev; University of Exeter; University of Haifa
摘要：We study all-pay contests with effort-dependent rewards under incomplete information. A contestant's value to winning depends not only on his type but also on the effort-dependent reward chosen by the designer. We analyze which reward is optimal for the designer when his objective is either total effort or highest effort. We find that under certain conditions the optimal reward may either be negative or even decreasing in effort; however, we find no advantage to having multiple rewards.
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作者：Argenziano, Rossella
作者单位：University of Essex
摘要：We consider a model of price competition in a duopoly with product differentiation and network effects. In the efficient allocation, both networks are active and the firm with the highest expected quality has the largest market share. To characterize the equilibrium allocation, we derive necessary and sufficient conditions for uniqueness of the equilibrium of the coordination game played by consumers for given prices. The equilibrium allocation differs from the efficient one for two reasons. F...
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作者：Chen, Yongmin; Riordan, Michael H.
作者单位：University of Colorado System; University of Colorado Boulder; Columbia University
摘要：In a discrete choice model of product differentiation, the symmetric duopoly price may be lower than, equal to, or higher than the single-product monopoly price. Whereas the market share effect encourages a duopolist to charge less than the monopoly price because a duopolist serves fewer consumers, the price sensitivity effect motivates a higher price when more consumer choice steepens the firm's demand curve. The joint distribution of consumer values for the two conceivable products determine...
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作者：Lach, Saul; Schankerman, Mark
作者单位：Hebrew University of Jerusalem; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
摘要：We show that universities in the United States that provide stronger royalty incentives to faculty scientists generate greater license income, controlling for university characteristics. We use pre-sample data on university patenting to control for the potential endogeneity of royalty shares. Faculty responds to royalties both in the form of cash and research lab support, indicating both pecuniary and intrinsic research motivations. The impact of incentives is larger in private than in public ...
