Contracts offered by bureaucrats

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Khalil, Fahad; Kim, Doyoung; Lawarree, Jacques
• 署名单位: University of Washington; University of Washington Seattle; Sogang University
• 刊物名称: RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0741-6261
• DOI: 10.1111/1756-2171.12037
• 发表日期: 2013
• 页码: 686-711
• 关键词: incentive contracts; DELEGATION; collusion; ORGANIZATIONS; GOVERNMENT; AGENCY; supervision; INFORMATION; motivation; OWNERSHIP

摘要

We examine the power of incentives in bureaucracies by studying contracts offered by a bureaucrat to her agent. The bureaucrat operates under a fixed budget, optimally chosen by a funding authority, and she can engage in policy drift, which we define as inversely related to her intrinsic motivation. Interaction between a fixed budget and policy drift results in low-powered incentives. We discuss how the bureaucrat may benefit from stricter accountability as it leads to larger budgets. Low-powered incentives remain even in an alternative centralized setting, where the funding authority contracts directly with the agent using the bureaucrat to monitor output.