Fear of rejection? Tiered certification and transparency
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Farhi, Emmanuel; Lerner, Josh; Tirole, Jean
署名单位：
Harvard University; Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics
刊物名称：
RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
ISSN/ISSBN：
0741-6261
DOI：
10.1111/1756-2171.12033
发表日期：
2013
页码：
610-631
关键词：
摘要：
Product quality certifiers may not reveal the identity of unsuccessful applicants/sellers for three reasons. First, they respond to the desire of individual sellers to avoid the stigma from rejection. Second, nontransparency helps a certifier to increase his market power by raising the stigma from lower-tier certification. Third, transparency does not help screen among heterogeneous sellers. Strategic complementarities arise as sellers move down the certification pecking order and lead to the stigmatization of the lower tiers. Mandating transparency benefits the sellers but has an ambiguous impact on buyers, who actually become less informed about product quality.
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