Trading and enforcing patent rights

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Galasso, Alberto; Schankerman, Mark; Serrano, Carlos J.
• 署名单位: University of Toronto; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; Pompeu Fabra University; Barcelona School of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research
• 刊物名称: RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0741-6261
• DOI: 10.1111/1756-2171.12020
• 发表日期: 2013
• 页码: 275-312
• 关键词: instrumental variables; models; incentives; PROTECTION; KNOWLEDGE; networks; thickets

摘要

We study how the market for innovation affects enforcement of patent rights. We show that patent transactions arising from comparative advantages in commercialization increase litigation, but trades driven by advantages in patent enforcement reduce it. Using data on trade and litigation of individually owned patents in the United States, we exploit variation in capital gains tax rates across states as an instrument to identify the causal effect of trade on litigation. We find that taxes strongly affect patent transactions, and that trade reduces litigation on average, but the impact is heterogeneous. Patents with larger potential gains from trade are more likely to change ownership, and the impact depends critically on transaction characteristics.