Relational contracting and endogenous formation of teamwork

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Ishihara, Akifumi
• 署名单位: National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies
• 刊物名称: RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0741-6261
• DOI: 10.1111/1756-2171.12178
• 发表日期: 2017
• 页码: 335-357
• 关键词: Incentives; teams; PRODUCTIVITY; performance; job

摘要

We study a relational contracting model with two agents where each agent faces multiple tasks: effort toward the agent's own project and helping effort toward another agent's project. We show that the optimal task structure is either specialization without help or teamwork with a substantial amount of help: teamwork with a small amount of help is never optimal. Specialization with high-powered incentives can be implemented by relative performance evaluation. However, under teamwork, the evaluation scheme must be substantially different to overcome the multitasking problem. Consequently, a small amount of help is dominated by specialization with high powered incentives.