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作者：Braido, Luis H. B.; Ledo, Bruno C. A.
作者单位：Getulio Vargas Foundation; Universidade de Sao Paulo
摘要：We analyze Brazilian data on auto insurance and document that (a) about 20% of policies are sold without brokerage commission; (b) over 40% are sold at the highest fee allowed; and (c) the remaining contracts are associated with a spread-out distribution of fees. Static models cannot rationalize these findings. We develop a dynamic model of price competition with search and switching costs that reproduces them. We use the equilibrium structure to estimate the model parameters and infer the bro...
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作者：Rhodes, Andrew; Wilson, Chris M.
作者单位：Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics; Loughborough University
摘要：There is widespread evidence that some firms use false advertising to overstate the value of their products. We consider a model in which a policy maker can punish such false claims. We characterize an equilibrium where false advertising actively influences rational buyers and analyze the effects of policy under different welfare objectives. We establish precise conditions where policy optimally permits a positive level of false advertising and show how these conditions vary intuitively with d...
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作者：Donna, Javier D.; Espin-Sanchez, Jose-Antonio
作者单位：University System of Ohio; Ohio State University; Yale University
摘要：We use data on sequential water auctions to estimate demand when units are complements or substitutes. A sequential English auction model determines the estimating structural equations. When units are complements, one bidder wins all units by paying a high price for the first unit, thus deterring others from bidding on subsequent units. When units are substitutes, different bidders win the units with positive probability, paying prices similar in magnitude. We recover individual demand consist...
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作者：Bijlsma, Michiel; Boone, Jan; Zwart, Gijsbert
作者单位：Tilburg University; CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy; University of Groningen
摘要：Perverse incentives for banks' traders have played a role in the financial crisis. We study how labor market competition interacts with the structure of compensation to result in excessive risk taking. In a model with trader moral hazard and adverse selection on trader abilities, we demonstrate how banks optimally induce top traders to take more risk as competition on the labor market intensifies, even if banks internalize the costs of negative outcomes. Distorting risk-taking incentives allow...
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作者：Johnson, Justin P.; Myatt, David P.
作者单位：Cornell University; University of London; London Business School
摘要：We study product line choice allowing for cost asymmetries but ruling out strategic motivations such as a desire to soften competition. We identify two forces that interact with asymmetric competition to shape equilibrium product lines. Possible outcomes range from head-to-head competition to complete separation of product lines and include the intermediate case of partial separation. In an international trade context, we predict which qualities a disadvantaged foreign producer will specialize...
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作者：Miravete, Eugenio J.; Moral, Maria J.; Thurk, Jeff
作者单位：University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR); Universidad Nacional de Educacion a Distancia (UNED); University of Notre Dame
摘要：Economic integration agreements have significantly decreased import tariffs. We investigate whether national policies can be an effective replacement for tariffs to protect domestic industry. We show that (a) European fuel taxes and vehicle emissions policy favored diesel vehicles, a technology popular with European consumers but largely offered only by domestic automakers; (b) European automakers benefited from pro-diesel fuel taxes and a lenient NOx emissions policy to earn significant profi...
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作者：Sanches, Fabio; Silva Junior, Daniel; Srisuma, Sorawoot
作者单位：Pontificia Universidade Catolica do Rio de Janeiro; City St Georges, University of London; University of Surrey
摘要：This article examines the effects of bank privatization on the number of bank branches operating in small isolated markets in Brazil. We estimate a dynamic game played between Brazilian public and private banks. We find private banks compete with each other as expected. We also find public banks generate positive spillovers for private banks. Our counterfactual study shows that privatization substantially reduces the number of banks. The government can mitigate the effects of privatization by ...
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作者：Houde, Sebastien
作者单位：Swiss Federal Institutes of Technology Domain; ETH Zurich
摘要：I study how consumers respond to competing pieces of information that differ in their degree of complexity and informativeness. In particular, I study the choice of refrigerators in the United States, where a mandatory disclosure labelling program provides detailed information about energy cost, and a certification labelling program provides a simple binary-star rating related to energy use. I find that the coarse certification may help some consumers to pay attention to energy information, bu...
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作者：Fang, Hanming; Wu, Zenan
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania; National Bureau of Economic Research; Peking University
摘要：We investigate whether selection based on multidimensional private information in risks and risk preferences can, under different market structures, result in a negative correlation between insurance coverage and expost realization of risk. We show that, under perfect competition, selection based on multidimensional private information does not result in the negative correlation property, unless there is a sufficiently high loading factor. However, it is possible to generate the negative corre...
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作者：Petrakis, Emmanuel; Tsakas, Nikolas
作者单位：University of Crete; University of Cyprus
摘要：We investigate the effect of potential entry on the formation and stability of R&D networks considering farsighted firms. The presence of a potential entrant often alters the incentives of incumbents to collaborate. Incumbent firms may form an otherwise undesirable collaboration to deter entry of a new firm. Moreover, an incumbent may refrain from establishing an otherwise desirable collaboration, expecting to form a more profitable link with the entrant. Finally, potential entry may lead an i...
