The optimal allocation of decision and exit rights in organizations

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bester, Helmut; Kraehmer, Daniel
• 署名单位: Free University of Berlin; University of Bonn
• 刊物名称: RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0741-6261
• DOI: 10.1111/1756-2171.12177
• 发表日期: 2017
• 页码: 309-334
• 关键词: incomplete contracts; cooperative investments; imperfect commitment; optimal delegation; INFORMATION; RENEGOTIATION; DESIGN; COMMUNICATION; incentives; authority

摘要

We show that in a bilateral relation with conflicting preferences and transferable utility it is unambiguously optimal to assign the authority over project decisions to the privately informed rather than the uninformed party. This holds irrespective of the degree of conflict and the distribution of private information. Under the optimal contract, the uninformed party is protected by an exit option, which it will exert when the decision maker has not chosen the promised decision. Exit terminates the relation and diminishes the project surplus. We show that the first-best efficient solution can be obtained by such a contract.