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作者：Spier, Kathryn E.; Prescott, J. J.
作者单位：Harvard University; National Bureau of Economic Research; University of Michigan System; University of Michigan
摘要：Two risk-averse litigants with different subjective beliefs negotiate in the shadow of a pending trial. Through contingent contracts, the litigants can mitigate risk and/or speculate on the trial outcome. Contingent contracting decreases the settlement rate and increases the volume and costs of litigation. These contingent contracts mimic the services provided by third-party investors, including litigation funders and insurance companies. The litigants (weakly) prefer to contract with risk-neu...
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作者：Vasserman, Shoshana; Yildiz, Muhamet
作者单位：Harvard University; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：We develop a tractable and versatile model of pretrial negotiation in which the negotiating parties are optimistic about the judge's decision and anticipate the possible arrival of public information about the case prior to the trial date. The parties will settle immediately upon the arrival of information. However, they may also agree to settle prior to an arrival. We derive the settlement dynamics prior to an arrival: negotiations result in either immediate agreement, a weak deadline effect-...
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作者：Raval, Devesh R.
摘要：This article provides evidence on the micro capital-labor elasticity of substitution and the bias of technology. Using data on US manufacturing plants, I find several facts inconsistent with a Cobb-Douglas production function, including large, persistent variation in capital shares. I then estimate the elasticity using variation in local wages, and several instruments for them, for identification. Estimates of the substitution elasticity using all plants range between 0.3 and 0.5, with similar...
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作者：Rochet, Jean-Charles; Thanassoulis, John
作者单位：University of Zurich; Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics; University of Warwick; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK
摘要：We study the two-product monopoly profit maximization problem for a seller who can commit to a dynamic pricing strategy. We show that if consumers' valuations are not strongly ordered, then optimality for the seller can require intertemporal price discrimination: the seller offers a choice between supplying a complete bundle now, or delaying the supply of a component of that bundle until a later date. For general valuations, we establish a sufficient condition for such dynamic pricing to be mo...
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作者：Stepanov, Sergey
作者单位：HSE University (National Research University Higher School of Economics)
摘要：I model the choice between a negotiated block trade and a public tender offer as means of acquiring control in a firm with a large minority blockholder. Potential acquirers differ in their (privately known) value-creation ability. In equilibrium, block trades are made by lower ability acquirers compared to tender offers. The equal opportunity rule (EOR) and the freezeout rule are complements in promoting efficiency of control transfers. Stronger investor protection may hamper value-increasing ...
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作者：de Corniere, Alexandre; Taylor, Greg
作者单位：Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics; University of Oxford
摘要：We study situations in which consumers rely on a biased intermediary's advice when choosing among sellers. We introduce the notion that sellers' and consumers' payoffs can be congruent or conflicting, and show that this has important implications for the effects of bias. Under congruence, the firm benefiting from bias has an incentive to offer a better deal than its rival and consumers can be better-off than under no bias. Under conflict, the favored firm offers lower utility, and bias harms c...
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作者：Linn, Joshua; McCormack, Kristen
作者单位：Harvard University
摘要：Between 2005 and 2015, US electricity sector emissions of nitrogen oxides and sulfur dioxide, which harm human health and the environment, declined by two thirds, and many coal-fired power plants became unprofitable and retired. Intense public controversy has focused on these changes, but the literature has not identified their underlying causes. Using a new electricity sector model of the US eastern interconnection that accurately reproduces unit operation, emissions, and retirement, we find ...
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作者：Fu, Shiming; Krishna, R. Vijay
作者单位：Shanghai University of Finance & Economics; State University System of Florida; Florida State University
摘要：We study a dynamic agency model where the agent privately observes the firm's cash flows that are subject to persistent shocks. We characterize the policy dynamics and implement the optimal contract by financial securities. Because bad performance distorts investors' beliefs downward, the agent has less incentive to misrepresent information. The agent's compensation is less than what he can divert and is convex in performance. As private information becomes more persistent, (i) the agent is co...
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作者：Inderst, Roman; Montez, Joao
作者单位：Goethe University Frankfurt; University of Lausanne
摘要：We study bilateral bargaining between several buyers and sellers in a framework that allows both sides, in case of a bilateral disagreement, flexibility to adjust trade with each of their other trading partners and receive the gross benefit generated by each adjustment. A larger buyer pays a higher per-unit price when buyers' bargaining power in bilateral negotiations is sufficiently low, and a lower price otherwise. An analogous result holds for sellers. These predictions, and the implication...
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作者：Polanski, Arnold
作者单位：University of East Anglia
摘要：Information goods (or information for short) play an essential role in modern economies. We consider a setup where information has some idiosyncratic value for each consumer, exerts externalities, and can be freely replicated and transmitted in a communication network. Prices paid for information are determined via the (asymmetric) Nash Bargaining Solution with endogenous disagreement points. This decentralized approach leads to unique prices and payoffs in any exogenous network. We use these ...
