A model of biased intermediation

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: de Corniere, Alexandre; Taylor, Greg
• 署名单位: Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics; University of Oxford
• 刊物名称: RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0741-6261
• DOI: 10.1111/1756-2171.12298
• 发表日期: 2019
• 页码: 854-882
• 关键词: net neutrality; certification; aggregators; COMPETITION; middlemen

摘要

We study situations in which consumers rely on a biased intermediary's advice when choosing among sellers. We introduce the notion that sellers' and consumers' payoffs can be congruent or conflicting, and show that this has important implications for the effects of bias. Under congruence, the firm benefiting from bias has an incentive to offer a better deal than its rival and consumers can be better-off than under no bias. Under conflict, the favored firm offers lower utility, and bias harms consumers. We study various policies for dealing with bias and show that their efficacy also depends on whether the payoffs exhibit congruence or conflict.