Intertemporal price discrimination with two products

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Rochet, Jean-Charles; Thanassoulis, John
• 署名单位: University of Zurich; Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics; University of Warwick; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK
• 刊物名称: RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0741-6261
• DOI: 10.1111/1756-2171.12301
• 发表日期: 2019
• 页码: 951-973
• 关键词: Monopoly; revenue; GOODS; optimization; mechanism

摘要

We study the two-product monopoly profit maximization problem for a seller who can commit to a dynamic pricing strategy. We show that if consumers' valuations are not strongly ordered, then optimality for the seller can require intertemporal price discrimination: the seller offers a choice between supplying a complete bundle now, or delaying the supply of a component of that bundle until a later date. For general valuations, we establish a sufficient condition for such dynamic pricing to be more profitable than mixed bundling. So we show that the established no-discrimination-across-time result does not extend to two-product sellers under standard taste distributions.