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作者：Chen, Ying; Eraslan, Huelya
作者单位：Johns Hopkins University; Rice University; University of Osaka
摘要：A decision maker makes a ruling on a random case in each period. She is uncertain about the correct ruling until conducting a costly investigation. A ruling establishes a precedent, which cannot be violated under binding precedent. We compare the information acquisition incentives, the evolution of standards and the social welfare under nonbinding and binding precedents. Compared to nonbinding precedent, under binding precedent, information acquisition incentives are stronger in earlier period...
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作者：Campbell, Arthur; Leister, C. Matthew; Zenou, Yves
作者单位：Monash University; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR)
摘要：We develop a word-of-mouth search model where information flows from the old to the new generation for an experience good with unknown quality. We study the features of the social network that determine product quality and welfare and characterize the demand-side (under provision of search effort) and supply-side (inefficient entry by firms) factors that result in inefficiencies. One striking result is to show that the more connected but also the less-unequal a friendship network is (in the se...
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作者：Laussel, Didier; Long, Ngo, V; Resende, Joana
作者单位：Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Aix-Marseille Universite; McGill University; Universidade do Porto
摘要：We show that a monopolist's profit is higher if he refrains from collecting coarse information on his customers, sticking to constant uniform pricing rather than recognizing customers' segments through their purchase history. In the Markov perfect equilibrium with coarse information collection, after each commitment period, a new introductory price is offered to attract new customers, creating a new market segment for price discrimination. Eventually, the whole market is covered. Shortening th...
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作者：Wang, James
作者单位：Federal Reserve System - USA
摘要：I evaluate how loan officers screen uncodified, soft information using data from China. After documenting substantial differences in loan decisions and outcomes across loan officers, I develop and estimate a screening model incorporating screening ability and beliefs regarding ability. Estimates imply that the typical loan officer is risk-averse, has heterogeneous screening ability, and behaves overconfidently-behaving as if he or she observes more from soft information than what the data woul...
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作者：Moshary, Sarah
作者单位：University of Chicago
摘要：In 2010, the US Supreme Court loosened contribution limits to Political Action Committees (PACs), sparking fears that big donors could exert outsize influence on elections by funding PAC advertising. However, PACs are potentially handicapped when buying advertising time; data from 2012 reveal that PACs pay 32% above regulated campaign rates. I estimate a model of demand for advertising by PACs, exploiting the misalignment of state and media market borders to address price endogeneity. I find t...
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作者：Tan, Xu; Wen, Quan
作者单位：University of Washington; University of Washington Seattle
摘要：A social planner selects heterogeneously biased experts to (either sequentially or simultaneously) acquire costly signals, and then agents vote between two alternatives. To maximize social welfare, the social planner adopts an alternating mechanism-choosing extremely biased experts whose preferences oppose the pivotal voter's current preference-in the optimal sequential mechanism, whereas she chooses mildly biased experts in the optimal simultaneous mechanism. Despite the flexibility of a sequ...
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作者：Li, Lingfang (Ivy); Tadelis, Steven; Zhou, Xiaolan
作者单位：Fudan University; Fudan University; University of California System; University of California Berkeley; National Bureau of Economic Research; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR); Leibniz Association; Ifo Institut; East China Normal University
摘要：Seller reputation, generated by buyer feedback, is critical to fostering trust in online marketplaces. Marketplaces or sellers may choose to compensate buyers for providing feedback. Signaling theory predicts that only sellers of high-quality products will reward buyers for truthful feedback, especially when a product lacks any feedback and when the seller is not established. We confirm these hypotheses using Taobao's reward-for-feedback mechanism. High-quality products, especially without est...
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作者：Kireyev, Pavel
作者单位：INSEAD Business School
摘要：I develop an empirical model of idea generation contests with heterogeneous participants and endogenous entry, fit the model to data from a platform used by major advertisers, and simulate counterfactual contest designs. The empirical model resolves ambiguous predictions yielded by contest theory about the effects of different prize structures on contest outcomes. Simulations reveal the impact of strategies that hold fixed total award and balance competition by handicapping advantaged particip...
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作者：Johnen, Johannes
作者单位：Universite Catholique Louvain
摘要：In many deceptive markets, firms design contracts to exploit mistakes of naive consumers. These contracts also attract less-profitable sophisticated consumers. I study such markets when firms compete repeatedly. By observing their customers' usage patterns, firms acquire private information about their level of naivete. First, I find that private information on naivete mitigates competition and is of great value even with homogeneous products. Second, competition between initially symmetricall...
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作者：Bull, Jesse; Watson, Joel
作者单位：State University System of Florida; Florida International University; University of California System; University of California San Diego
摘要：We propose a new model of disclosure, interpretation, and management of hard evidence in the context of litigation and similar applications. A litigant has private information and may also possess hard evidence that can be disclosed to a fact-finder, who interprets the evidence and decides a finding in the case. We identify conditions under which hard evidence generates value that is robust to the scope of rational reasoning and behavior. These fail if the litigant's private information is suf...
