Buyer power and mutual dependency in a model of negotiations

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Inderst, Roman; Montez, Joao
• 署名单位: Goethe University Frankfurt; University of Lausanne
• 刊物名称: RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0741-6261
• DOI: 10.1111/1756-2171.12261
• 发表日期: 2019
• 页码: 29-56
• 关键词: price-discrimination; empirical-evidence; Shapley value

摘要

We study bilateral bargaining between several buyers and sellers in a framework that allows both sides, in case of a bilateral disagreement, flexibility to adjust trade with each of their other trading partners and receive the gross benefit generated by each adjustment. A larger buyer pays a higher per-unit price when buyers' bargaining power in bilateral negotiations is sufficiently low, and a lower price otherwise. An analogous result holds for sellers. These predictions, and the implications of different technologies, are explained by the fact that size is a source of mutual dependency and not an unequivocal source of power.