Price discrimination in political advertising: Evidence from the 2012 presidential election

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Moshary, Sarah
• 署名单位: University of Chicago
• 刊物名称: RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0741-6261
• DOI: 10.1111/1756-2171.12335
• 发表日期: 2020
• 页码: 615-649
• 关键词: competition; mergers; BIAS

摘要

In 2010, the US Supreme Court loosened contribution limits to Political Action Committees (PACs), sparking fears that big donors could exert outsize influence on elections by funding PAC advertising. However, PACs are potentially handicapped when buying advertising time; data from 2012 reveal that PACs pay 32% above regulated campaign rates. I estimate a model of demand for advertising by PACs, exploiting the misalignment of state and media market borders to address price endogeneity. I find that prices reflect willingness-to-pay for viewer demographics rather than media bias. The estimates further suggest that network-owned stations discriminate more successfully than do local affiliates.