Screening soft information: evidence from loan officers

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Wang, James
• 署名单位: Federal Reserve System - USA
• 刊物名称: RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0741-6261
• DOI: 10.1111/1756-2171.12357
• 发表日期: 2020
• 页码: 1287-1322
• 关键词: portfolio management; career concerns; credit markets; moral hazard; overconfidence; constraints; asymmetries

摘要

I evaluate how loan officers screen uncodified, soft information using data from China. After documenting substantial differences in loan decisions and outcomes across loan officers, I develop and estimate a screening model incorporating screening ability and beliefs regarding ability. Estimates imply that the typical loan officer is risk-averse, has heterogeneous screening ability, and behaves overconfidently-behaving as if he or she observes more from soft information than what the data would indicate. However, I still find that loan officers offer value over benchmarks that ignore soft information. Counterfactuals on compensation, loan assignment, and training further explore the limits of screening.