Buying reputation as a signal of quality: Evidence from an online marketplace

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Li, Lingfang (Ivy); Tadelis, Steven; Zhou, Xiaolan
• 署名单位: Fudan University; Fudan University; University of California System; University of California Berkeley; National Bureau of Economic Research; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR); Leibniz Association; Ifo Institut; East China Normal University
• 刊物名称: RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0741-6261
• DOI: 10.1111/1756-2171.12346
• 发表日期: 2020
• 页码: 965-988
• 关键词: feedback; mechanisms; platform

摘要

Seller reputation, generated by buyer feedback, is critical to fostering trust in online marketplaces. Marketplaces or sellers may choose to compensate buyers for providing feedback. Signaling theory predicts that only sellers of high-quality products will reward buyers for truthful feedback, especially when a product lacks any feedback and when the seller is not established. We confirm these hypotheses using Taobao's reward-for-feedback mechanism. High-quality products, especially without established feedback, are chosen for feedback rewards, which cause sales to increase by 36%. Marketplaces and consumers can therefore benefit from allowing sellers to buy feedback and signal their high-quality products in the process.