DYNAMIC PUBLIC-GOODS PROVISION WITH COALITIONAL MANIPULATION

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: CHAKRAVORTI, B
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/0047-2727(93)01410-C
• 发表日期: 1995
• 页码: 143-161
• 关键词: PLANNING PROCEDURE; DYNAMIC EQUITY; CONVERGENCE; implementation; SUBGAME-PERFECT COALITION-PROOF EQUILIBRIUM

摘要

We study dynamic procedures for the provision of an efficient level of a public good with time-dependent surplus distribution. In general, such procedures are prone to manipulation via pre-play communication among coalitions of agents. We begin with a generalization of Truchon's (Econometrica, 1984, 52, 1179-1190) elegant non-myopic MDP procedure and provide a new procedure that exhibits finite, monotone convergence to Pareto-efficiency in Subgame-Perfect Coalition-proof equilibrium. This procedure also implements any 'regular' surplus distribution rule that is dependent on the public good level. The solution concept of Subgame-Perfect Coalition-proof equilibrium is also new. It is an extension of the semistability characterizations of Coalition-proof equilibrium for infinite-strategy games due to Kahn and Mookherjee (Games and Economic Behavior, 1992, 4, 101-121). The coalition-proofing device given is more generally applicable.