STRATEGIC TRANSFERS AND PRIVATE PROVISION OF PUBLIC-GOODS

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: BUCHHOLZ, W; KONRAD, KA
• 署名单位: Free University of Berlin; University of Bergen
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/0047-2727(95)80008-W
• 发表日期: 1995
• 页码: 489-505
• 关键词: private provision of public goods; VOLUNTARY TRANSFERS

摘要

This paper considers strategic monetary transfers between two agents when these contribute to a mutual public good. If the agents differ in their contribution productivity, then the less productive agent has an incentive to make large unconditional transfers to the more productive agent. Although agents move simultaneously in each stage of the game, the less productive agent becomes a Stackelberg leader. Furthermore, the generic subgame perfect equilibrium is characterized by full specialization.