MULTI-FIRM REGULATION WITHOUT LUMP-SUM TAXES

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: LOCKWOOD, B
• 署名单位: Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/0047-2727(93)01405-Y
• 发表日期: 1995
• 页码: 31-53
• 关键词: MULTI-FIRM REGULATION; PRINCIPAL MULTIAGENT PROBLEMS

摘要

This paper considers a problem of multi-firm regulation where the regulator cannot make monetary transfers to or from firms. Otherwise, the set-up is standard; two firms charging two-part tariffs sell in separate markets, and marginal costs are private information. Without transfers, the regulator faces an additional consumer participation constraint that the representative consumer must wish to participate in the market in all states. The paper studies the second-best optimal regulatory scheme that respects this constraint, and shows that it has some surprising properties: (i) the regulator may wish to drive informational rents down to zero even at the cost of some price distortion; (ii) consumer surplus may be zero in some states; and (iii) the price that one firm charges is decreasing in the other's cost.