-
作者：JANEBA, E
摘要：In the presence of international capital mobility, foreign direct investment is influenced by corporate income tax rates and the rules of how taxes paid in the host country are treated at home. In this paper the exemption, credit and deduction methods are considered as tax rules. Tax competition is modeled as a non-cooperative game with respect to both corporate tax rates and the form of double taxation relief. The subgame perfect equilibrium is shown to be independent of the tax rules. Since ...
-
作者：KANNIAINEN, V; SODERSTEN, J
作者单位：Uppsala University
摘要：This paper shows that for the analysis of a tax policy, it is important to be explicit about the reporting convention to which a corporation tax is required (or allowed) to adhere. The paper shows that the corporation tax cannot be used to alter capital formation under uniform reporting, a convention required by the majority of the OECD countries. This tax is, however, a more useful policy tool in those OECD countries that have created the privilege of separate reporting. Fiscal depreciation m...
-
作者：NICHELE, V; ROBIN, JM
作者单位：Institut Polytechnique de Paris; ENSAE Paris
摘要：This paper assesses the consequences of two reforms of the French indirect taxation system: a VAT harmonization which is close to initial EC proposals and a carbon tax which aims at decreasing the emissions of carbon dioxide. We simulate the effects of tax reforms using estimates of a model of household expenditure behaviour. Estimation is obtained by using the property of perfect aggregation over households of the Almost Ideal demand system on pooled micro data from the 1978-79, 1984-85, 1989...
-
作者：BESLEY, T; JEWITT, I
作者单位：University of Bristol
摘要：Diamond and Mirrlees (American Economic Review, 1971, 61, 8-27 and 261-278) showed that the first-order conditions for the Ramsey tax problem do not necessarily characterize tax optima. Researchers have since become cautious in using the first-order conditions. This paper establishes the validity of a version of the first-order conditions, using them to determine when uniform taxation is optimal. We show Deaton's (Review of Economic Studies, 1979, 46, 391-405) conditions to be sufficient, but ...
-
作者：LEWIS, TR; SAPPINGTON, DEM
作者单位：State University System of Florida; University of Florida
摘要：We consider the design of government policy to ration such scarce resources as water or pollution permits in the presence of limited information. When government policy is formulated, some informed agents (e.g. established public utilities) know how highly they value the resource. Other uninformed agents (e.g. potential independent power producers) only learn their valuations at some later date. The government allows uninformed agents to trade the resource rights they receive on a competitive ...
-
作者：CIGNO, A
摘要：The analysis in Nishimura and Zhang (Journal of Public Economics, 1992, 48, 239-258) (N-Z) relies on an unstated assumption that, either individuals are able to coordinate their fertility decisions, or individual pensions are conditional on individual fertility. The present note criticizes this assumption, and shows what happens if it is dropped. Introducing a social security system with a rate of tax equal to the socially optimal transfer from the young to the old will have no effect on ferti...
-
作者：GROSS, J
摘要：Revealed preference techniques are used to investigate the degree of heterogeneity of local public good preferences by testing the hypothesis that demographic characteristics are correlated with preferences for expenditure on public education. The test relies on a goodness-of-fit index which is on an estimation of wasted consumer expenditure. We use bootstrap techniques to estimate the distribution of the test statistic. Preference heterogeneity is found to be common, however Democrat-Protesta...
-
作者：REBITZER, JB; TAYLOR, LJ
作者单位：National Bureau of Economic Research; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); Carnegie Mellon University
摘要：Economists generally agree that the effect of a binding minimum wage law is to move firms backward along the demand curve for low skill workers. However, this prediction of worker displacement depends critically on the assumption that the productivity of firms' labor is not dependent on the wage. In this paper we show that in a conventional efficiency wage model, a minimum wage may increase the level of employment in low wage jobs. The formal logic of our model is similar to the case of labor ...
-
作者：VAGSTAD, S
作者单位：University of Bergen
摘要：If a government cares for local firms' profit, but not for foreign firms', foreign firms will be discriminated against when competing for government procurement contracts. Foreign firms will be chosen less often and, when chosen, earn less profit than local firms. We analyze a more central authority's policies against such discrimination given a situation in which a government has private information on product quality, and the competing firms have private information on own costs. Necessary a...
-
作者：FABELLA, RV
摘要：This paper shows that the entry of opposition to a transfer which raises overall Tullock outlays is welfare-enhancing when the number of rent-seekers is large. The spending of the opposition exceeds the fall in the combined spending of rent-seekers. Opposition when there is a single rent-seeker or an entrenched beneficiary is never welfare-enhancing. The larger the number of aspirants to a transfer, the smaller is the number of consumers required to render the consumer lobby ineffective when f...
