THE SOCIAL COST OF RENT-SEEKING UNDER COUNTERVAILING OPPOSITION TO DISTORTIONARY TRANSFERS

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: FABELLA, RV
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/0047-2727(94)01456-X
• 发表日期: 1995
• 页码: 235-247
• 关键词: rent seeking; opposition; transfers

摘要

This paper shows that the entry of opposition to a transfer which raises overall Tullock outlays is welfare-enhancing when the number of rent-seekers is large. The spending of the opposition exceeds the fall in the combined spending of rent-seekers. Opposition when there is a single rent-seeker or an entrenched beneficiary is never welfare-enhancing. The larger the number of aspirants to a transfer, the smaller is the number of consumers required to render the consumer lobby ineffective when free riding is allowed.