USING MARKETS TO ALLOCATE POLLUTION PERMITS AND OTHER SCARCE RESOURCE RIGHTS UNDER LIMITED INFORMATION

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: LEWIS, TR; SAPPINGTON, DEM
• 署名单位: State University System of Florida; University of Florida
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/0047-2727(95)80005-T
• 发表日期: 1995
• 页码: 431-455
• 关键词: pollution; RESOURCE RIGHTS; TRADING; ALLOCATION MECHANISMS

摘要

We consider the design of government policy to ration such scarce resources as water or pollution permits in the presence of limited information. When government policy is formulated, some informed agents (e.g. established public utilities) know how highly they value the resource. Other uninformed agents (e.g. potential independent power producers) only learn their valuations at some later date. The government allows uninformed agents to trade the resource rights they receive on a competitive market. Informed agents may or may not have the same privilege. The optimal initial distribution of resource rights differs significantly according to whether informed agents can trade the rights they receive.