Inefficient equilibria in lobbying

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Kirschsteiger, G; Prat, A
• 署名单位: Tilburg University; University of Vienna; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• 发表日期: 2001
• 页码: 349-375
• 关键词: inefficiencies in lobbying; common agency; truthful equilibrium; natural equilibrium

摘要

Lobbying is often represented as a common agency game. Common agency games typically have multiple equilibria. One class of equilibria, called truthful, has been identified by Bernheim and Whinston [Quarterly Journal of Economics 1986;101(1):1-31]. In this paper, we identify another class of equilibria, which we call natural, in which each principal offers a positive contribution on at most one alternative. We run an experiment on a common agency game for which the two equilibria predict a different equilibrium alternative. The alternative predicted by the natural equilibrium is chosen in 65% of the matches, while the one predicted by the truthful equilibrium is chosen in less than 5% of the matches. (C) 2001 Elsevier Science BY All rights reserved.