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作者：Carpenter, Jeffrey; Myers, Caitlin Knowles
作者单位：Middlebury College
摘要：We examine motivations for prosocial behavior using new data on volunteer firefighters that contain a dictator game based measure of altruism, surveyed measures of other behavioral factors, and call records that provide an objective measure of time spent volunteering. Controlling for a variety of other explanations, we find that the decision to volunteer is positively correlated with altruism as well as with concern for social reputation or image. Moreover, by utilizing variation in the presen...
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作者：Tang, Ning; Mitchell, Olivia S.; Mottola, Gary R.; Utkus, Stephen P.
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania
摘要：To evaluate the extent of inefficient behavior in 401(k) pensions, now the dominant form of retirement saving in America, we attribute inefficiencies separately to the employer's menu design versus participant portfolio elections. Results from our analysis of over 1000 plans and a million participants demonstrate that most sponsors offer efficient investment menus, but participants undo this by constructing inefficient portfolios thus reducing their potential retirement wealth by one-fifth. Be...
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作者：Fox, Justin; Van Weelden, Richard
作者单位：Yale University; Yale University
摘要：We examine the welfare effects of partisanship in a model of checks and balances. An executive makes a policy proposal and an overseer then decides whether or not to veto the executive's proposal. Both the executive and the overseer have private information as to the correct policy to pursue, and both are motivated by the desire to appear competent. A partisan overseer is one who, in addition to seeking to promote her own reputation, cares how her decision will impact the executive's reputatio...
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作者：Eslava, Marcela
作者单位：Universidad de los Andes (Colombia)
摘要：I study the policy choices of members of a central bank committee, who are appointed by the government. Central bankers balance their desire to protect the Central Bank's reputation against their interest to be reappointed. Committees can be more successful than single central bankers at reducing inflation and insulating policy from government pressures. These gains are only achieved if the turnover rate of committee members is low and the committee is small. The former is associated with a lo...
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作者：Gabriel, Stuart A.; Rosenthal, Stuart S.
作者单位：Syracuse University; University of California System; University of California Los Angeles
摘要：The dramatic government takeover of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in September, 2008 was motivated in part by a desire to ensure a continued flow of credit to the mortgage market. This study examines a closely related issue: the extent to which GSE activity crowds out mortgage purchases by private secondary market intermediaries. Evidence of substantial crowd out suggests that government support for the GSEs may be less warranted, whereas the absence of crowd out implies that GSE loan purchases e...
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作者：Gagliarducci, Stefano; Nannicini, Tommaso; Naticchioni, Paolo
作者单位：University of Rome Tor Vergata; Bocconi University; University of Cassino
摘要：In most modern democracies elected officials can work in the private sector while appointed in parliament. We show that when the political and market sectors are not mutually exclusive, a trade-off arises between the quality of elected officials and the time they devote to political life. If high-ability citizens can keep earning money outside of parliament, they will be more likely to run for election; for the same reason, they will also be more likely to shirk once elected. These predictions...
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作者：Couprie, Helene; Peluso, Eugenio; Trannoy, Alain
作者单位：CY Cergy Paris Universite; University of Verona; Aix-Marseille Universite
摘要：The structure of intra-household allocation is crucial to know whether a transfer from a rich household to a poor one translates into a transfer from a rich individual to a poor one. If rich households are more unequal than poor ones, then a progressive transfer among households reduces intra-household inequality, hence inequality among individuals. More specifically, two conditions have to be satisfied for extending Generalized Lorenz judgments from household level to individual one. The frac...
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作者：Hsieh, Chang-Tai; Shimizutani, Satoshi; Hori, Masahiro
作者单位：University of Chicago; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：In March 1999, 31 million shopping coupons worth 20,000 yen each were distributed to Japanese families with children and to the elderly. The coupons expired after six months and could only be used within the recipient's local community. We use variation in the number of children across families and in the number of recipients across prefectures to measure the effect of the coupons on spending. We find that coupons had a positive effect on spending on semi-durables, but no effect on spending on...
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作者：Messer, Kent D.; Poe, Gregory L.; Rondeau, Daniel; Schulze, William D.; Vossler, Christian A.
作者单位：University of Delaware; Cornell University; University of Victoria; University of Tennessee System; University of Tennessee Knoxville
摘要：Public referenda are frequently used to determine the provision of public goods. As public programs have distributional consequences, a compelling question is what impact, if any, do social preferences have on voting behavior. This paper explores this issue using laboratory experiments wherein voting outcomes lead to a known distribution of net benefits across participants. Preferences are elicited using a novel Random Price Voting Mechanism (RPVM), which is more efficient in eliciting prefere...
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作者：Boucher, Vincent; Bramoulle, Yann
作者单位：Laval University; Universite de Montreal
摘要：We study how uncertainty and risk aversion affect international agreements to supply global public goods. We consider a benchmark model with homogeneous countries and linear payoffs. When countries directly contribute to a public good, uncertainty tends to lower signatories' efforts but may increase participation. Despite risk aversion, uncertainty may improve welfare. In contrast, when countries try to reduce a global public bad, uncertainty tends to increase signatories' efforts and decrease...
