Providing global public goods under uncertainty

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Boucher, Vincent; Bramoulle, Yann
• 署名单位: Laval University; Universite de Montreal
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2010.06.008
• 发表日期: 2010
• 页码: 591-603
• 关键词: Global public goods; climate change; International agreements; uncertainty; risk aversion

摘要

We study how uncertainty and risk aversion affect international agreements to supply global public goods. We consider a benchmark model with homogeneous countries and linear payoffs. When countries directly contribute to a public good, uncertainty tends to lower signatories' efforts but may increase participation. Despite risk aversion, uncertainty may improve welfare. In contrast, when countries try to reduce a global public bad, uncertainty tends to increase signatories' efforts and decrease participation. In that case, an exante reduction of uncertainty may have a large positive multiplier effect on welfare. (C) 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.