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作者：Berggren, Niclas; Jordahl, Henrik; Poutvaara, Panu
作者单位：University of Helsinki; Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN)
摘要：We study the role of beauty in politics using candidate photos that figured prominently in electoral campaigns Our investigation is based oil visual assessments of 1929 Finnish political candidates from 10,011 respondents (of which 3708 were Finnish) As Finland has a proportional electoral system, we are able to compare the electoral success of non-incumbent candidates representing the same party An increase in our measure of beauty by one standard deviation is associated with an increase of 2...
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作者：Gupta, Nabanita Datta; Simonsen, Marianne
作者单位：Aarhus University; Aarhus University
摘要：Exploiting a rich panel data child survey merged with administrative records along with a pseudo-experiment generating variation in the take-Lip of preschool across Municipalities. we provide evidence of the effects oil non-cognitive child outcomes of participating in large scale publicly provided universal preschool programs and family day care vis-a-vis home care We find that. compared to home care, being enrolled in preschool at age three does not lead to significant differences In child Ou...
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作者：Propper, Carol; Sutton, Matt; Whitnall, Carolyn; Windmeijer, Frank
作者单位：University of Bristol; University of Bristol; Imperial College London; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; University of Manchester; University of Aberdeen
摘要：Performance targets are commonly used in the public sector, despite their well known problems when organisations have multiple objectives and performance is difficult to measure. It is possible that such targets may work where there is considerable consensus that performance needs to be improved. We investigate this possibility by examining the response of the English National Health Service to high profile waiting time targets. We exploit a natural policy experiment between two countries of t...
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作者：Alcalde, Jose; Dahm, Matthias
作者单位：Universitat d'Alacant; Universitat d'Alacant; Universitat Rovira i Virgili
摘要：We consider rent seeking contests between at least two agents who might Value the prize differently We capture a wide range of institutional aspects of contests by analyzing a class Of Contest Success functions fulfilling several properties The main properties are anonymity and a condition oil the elasticity of a rent seeker's win probability with respect to her effort We show the existence of a mixed-strategy equilibrium and establish equilibrium payoffs In this equilibrium complete rent diss...
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作者：Cervellati, Matteo; Esteban, Joan; Kranich, Laurence
作者单位：Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Cientificas (CSIC); CSIC - Institut d'Analisi Economica (IAE); University of Bologna; IZA Institute Labor Economics; State University of New York (SUNY) System; University at Albany, SUNY
摘要：We examine the interactions between individual behavior, sentiments and the social contract in a model of rational voting over redistribution. Agents have moral work values. Individuals' self-esteem and social consideration of others are endogenously determined comparing behaviors to moral standards. Attitudes toward redistribution depend on self-interest and social preferences. We characterize the politico-economic equilibria in which sentiments, labor supply and redistribution are determined...
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作者：van der Ploeg, Frederick
作者单位：University of Amsterdam; Tinbergen Institute; University of Amsterdam; University of Oxford
摘要：The effects of stochastic oil demand on optimal oil extraction paths and tax, spending and government debt policies are analyzed when the oil demand schedule is linear and preferences quadratic. Without prudence, optimal oil extraction is governed by the Hotelling rule and optimal budgetary policies by the tax and consumption smoothing principle. Volatile oil demand brings forward oil extraction and induces a bigger government surplus. With prudence, the government depletes oil reserves even m...
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作者：Fudenberg, Drew; Pathak, Parag A.
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); Harvard University
摘要：Costly punishment can facilitate cooperation in public-goods games, as human subjects will incur costs to punish non-cooperators even in settings where it is unlikely that they will face the same opponents again Understanding when and Why it occurs is important both for the design of economic institutions and for modeling the evolution of cooperation Our experiment shows that subjects will engage in costly Punishment even when it will not be observed until the end of the session, which support...
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作者：Ashworth, Scott; Shotts, Kenneth W.
作者单位：University of Chicago; Stanford University
摘要：Elections sometimes give policy makers incentives to pander, i.e., to implement a policy that voters think is in their best interest, even though the policy maker knows that a different policy is actually better for the voters. Pandering incentives are typically attenuated when voters learn, prior to the election, whether the policy chosen by the incumbent truly was in their best interest. This suggests that the media can improve accountability by reporting to voters information about whether ...
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作者：Barbieri, Stefano; Malueg, David A.
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Riverside; Tulane University
摘要：We introduce threshold uncertainty, a la Nitzan and Romano (1990), into a private-values model of voluntary provision of a discrete public good. Players are allowed to make any level of contribution toward funding the good, which is provided if the cost threshold is reached. Otherwise, contributions are refunded. Conditions ensuring existence and uniqueness of a Bayesian equilibrium are established. Further restricting the threshold uncertainty to a uniform distribution, we show the equilibriu...
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作者：Brunner, Eric J.; Ross, Stephen L.
作者单位：University of Connecticut; Quinnipiac University
摘要：This paper examines whether the voter with the median income is decisive in local spending decisions. Previous tests have relied on cross-sectional data while we make use of a pair of California referenda to estimate a first difference specification. The referenda proposed to lower the required vote share for passing local educational bonding initiatives from 67 to 50% and 67 to 55%, respectively. We find that voters rationally consider future public service decisions when deciding how to vote...
