Social preferences and voting: An exploration using a novel preference revealing mechanism

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Messer, Kent D.; Poe, Gregory L.; Rondeau, Daniel; Schulze, William D.; Vossler, Christian A.
• 署名单位: University of Delaware; Cornell University; University of Victoria; University of Tennessee System; University of Tennessee Knoxville
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2009.12.004
• 发表日期: 2010
• 页码: 308-317
• 关键词: Voting; social preferences; Random price voting mechanism

摘要

Public referenda are frequently used to determine the provision of public goods. As public programs have distributional consequences, a compelling question is what impact, if any, do social preferences have on voting behavior. This paper explores this issue using laboratory experiments wherein voting outcomes lead to a known distribution of net benefits across participants. Preferences are elicited using a novel Random Price Voting Mechanism (RPVM), which is more efficient in eliciting preferences than a dichotomous choice referendum but gives consistent results. Results suggest that social preferences, in particular a social efficiency motive, lead to economically meaningful deviations from selfish voting choices and increase the likelihood that welfare-enhancing programs are implemented. (C) 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.