Threshold uncertainty in the private-information subscription game

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Barbieri, Stefano; Malueg, David A.
• 署名单位: University of California System; University of California Riverside; Tulane University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2010.07.003
• 发表日期: 2010
• 页码: 848-861
• 关键词: Discrete public good; Subscription game; Threshold uncertainty

摘要

We introduce threshold uncertainty, a la Nitzan and Romano (1990), into a private-values model of voluntary provision of a discrete public good. Players are allowed to make any level of contribution toward funding the good, which is provided if the cost threshold is reached. Otherwise, contributions are refunded. Conditions ensuring existence and uniqueness of a Bayesian equilibrium are established. Further restricting the threshold uncertainty to a uniform distribution, we show the equilibrium strategies are very simple, even allowing for any number of players with asymmetric distributions of values. Comparative statics with respect to changes in players' distributions are derived, allowing changes in both the intensity and the dispersion of values. For example, increased uncertainty, in the sense of mean-preserving spreads of players' distributions of values, increases equilibrium contributions. Finally, we show the equilibrium is interim incentive inefficient. The sharpness of our results greatly contrasts with the more qualified insights of earlier private-values models with known cost threshold, which relied on there being two symmetric players and generally exhibited multiple equilibria. (C) 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.