Rent seeking and rent dissipation: A neutrality result

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Alcalde, Jose; Dahm, Matthias
• 署名单位: Universitat d'Alacant; Universitat d'Alacant; Universitat Rovira i Virgili
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2009.11.005
• 发表日期: 2010
• 页码: 1-7
• 关键词: (Non-)deterministic contest; all-pay auction; Contest success functions

摘要

We consider rent seeking contests between at least two agents who might Value the prize differently We capture a wide range of institutional aspects of contests by analyzing a class Of Contest Success functions fulfilling several properties The main properties are anonymity and a condition oil the elasticity of a rent seeker's win probability with respect to her effort We show the existence of a mixed-strategy equilibrium and establish equilibrium payoffs In this equilibrium complete rent dissipation holds Our results imply a partial robustness result for the all-pay auction (C) 2009 Elsevier B V All rights reserved.