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作者：Fergusson, Leopoldo
作者单位：Universidad de los Andes (Colombia)
摘要：This paper examines the role of mass media in countering special interest group influence. I use the concentration of campaign contributions from Political Action Committees to proxy for special interests' capture of US Senate candidates from 1980 to 2002, and compare the reaction of voters to increases in concentration in two different types of media markets: in-state media markets and out-of-state media markets. Unlike in-state media markets, out-of-state markets focus on neighboring states'...
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作者：Ashraf, Nava; Bandiera, Oriana; Jack, B. Kelsey
作者单位：National Bureau of Economic Research; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; Tufts University
摘要：We conduct a field experiment to evaluate the effect of extrinsic rewards, both financial and non-financial, on the performance of agents recruited by a public health organization to promote HIV prevention and sell condoms. In this setting: (i) non-financial rewards are effective at improving performance; (ii) the effect of both types of rewards is stronger for pro-socially motivated agents; and (iii) both types of rewards are effective when their relative value is high. The findings illustrat...
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作者：Lilley, Andrew; Slonim, Robert
作者单位：University of Sydney
摘要：This paper presents a model and experimental evidence to explain the volunteering puzzle where agents prefer volunteering time to donating money when monetary donations are, ceteris paribus, more efficient for providing resources to charity. In the model agents receive heterogeneous utility from pure and impure altruism (Andreoni, 1989) that permits warm glow to vary between monetary donations and volunteering, thus allowing preferences for impure altruism to rationalize inefficient allocation...
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作者：Yildirim, Huseyin
作者单位：Duke University
摘要：We provide a full equilibrium characterization of warm-glow giving a la Andreoni (1989, 1990) by extending the Andreoni-McGuire (1993) algorithm. We then generalize and offer an intuitive meaning to the large-economy crowding-out results by Ribar and Wilhelm (2002). The algorithm indexes individuals according to their free-riding levels of the public good. This level is finite for an individual whose donation is always dictated by some altruism or concern for charity. We show that if all indiv...
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作者：Silverman, Dan; Slemrod, Joel; Uler, Neslihan
作者单位：Arizona State University; Arizona State University-Tempe; University of Michigan System; University of Michigan
摘要：Authority, and the behavioral response to authority, is central to many important questions in public economics, but has received insufficient attention from economists. In particular, research has not differentiated between legitimate power and the presumption of expert knowledge, what we call authority to and authority in. In this paper we report on the results of a series of lab experiments designed to distinguish the effects of the two sources of authority on contributions to a public proj...
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作者：Aidt, Toke S.; Mooney, Graham
作者单位：University of Cambridge; Johns Hopkins University
摘要：We study the opportunistic political budget cycle in the London Metropolitan Boroughs between 1902 and 1937 under two different suffrage regimes: taxpayer suffrage (1902-1914) and universal suffrage (1921-1937). We argue and find supporting evidence that the political budget cycle operates differently under the two types of suffrage. Taxpayer suffrage, where the right to vote and the obligation to pay local taxes are linked, encourages demands for retrenchment and the political budget cycle ma...
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作者：Hummel, Patrick; Holden, Richard
作者单位：Alphabet Inc.; Google Incorporated; University of New South Wales Sydney
摘要：We analyze a model of US presidential primary elections for a given party. There are two candidates, one of whom is a higher quality candidate. Voters reside in m different states and receive noisy private information about the identity of the superior candidate. States vote in some order, and this order is chosen by a social planner. We provide conditions under which the ordering of the states that maximizes the probability that the higher quality candidate is elected is for states to vote in...
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作者：Millner, Antony; Ollivier, Helene; Simon, Leo
作者单位：University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Paris School of Economics; University of California System; University of California Berkeley; Swiss Federal Institutes of Technology Domain; ETH Zurich
摘要：We consider a two period model in which an incumbent political party chooses the level of a current policy variable unilaterally, but faces competition from a political opponent in the future. Both parties care about voters' payoffs, but they have different beliefs about how policy choices will map into future economic outcomes. We show that when the incumbent party can endogenously influence whether learning occurs through its policy choices (policy experimentation), future political competit...
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作者：Chowdhury, Subhasish M.; Jeon, Joo Young
作者单位：University of East Anglia; University of East Anglia
摘要：We investigate the consequences of a pure income effect on the altruistic behavior of donors. Inequality aversion theories predict either no effect or a decrease in giving, whereas impure altruism theory predicts an increase in giving with an increase in the common income of donor and receiver. Theoretical predictions being contradictory, we run a dictator game in which we vary the common show-up fee of both the dictator and the recipient, while keeping an extra amount to be shared the same. T...
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作者：Kessler, Judd B.; Roth, Alvin E.
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania; Stanford University
摘要：Giving registered organ donors priority on organ waiting lists, as has been implemented in Israel and Singapore, provides an incentive for registration and has the potential to increase the pool of deceased donor organs. However, the implementation of a priority rule might allow for loopholes - as is the case in Israel - in which an individual can register to receive priority but avoid ever being in a position to donate organs. We experimentally investigate how such a loophole affects donation...
