No margin, no mission? A field experiment on incentives for public service delivery

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Ashraf, Nava; Bandiera, Oriana; Jack, B. Kelsey
• 署名单位: National Bureau of Economic Research; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; Tufts University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2014.06.014
• 发表日期: 2014
• 页码: 1-17
• 关键词: financial incentives; Non-monetary rewards; Pro-social motivation; Public service delivery

摘要

We conduct a field experiment to evaluate the effect of extrinsic rewards, both financial and non-financial, on the performance of agents recruited by a public health organization to promote HIV prevention and sell condoms. In this setting: (i) non-financial rewards are effective at improving performance; (ii) the effect of both types of rewards is stronger for pro-socially motivated agents; and (iii) both types of rewards are effective when their relative value is high. The findings illustrate that extrinsic rewards can improve the performance of agents engaged in public service delivery, and that non-financial rewards can be effective in settings where the power of financial incentives is limited. (C) 2014 Published by Elsevier B.V.