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作者：Casella, Alessandra; Palfrey, Thomas; Turban, Sebastien
作者单位：Columbia University; National Bureau of Economic Research; California Institute of Technology
摘要：Two groups of voters of known sizes disagree over a single binary decision to be taken by simple majority. Individuals have different, privately observed intensities of preferences and before voting can buy or sell votes among themselves for money. We study, theoretically and experimentally, the implication of such trading for outcomes and welfare when trades are coordinated by the two group leaders and when they take place anonymously in a competitive market. The theory has strong predictions...
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作者：Bettendorf, Leon J. H.; Folmer, Kees; Jongen, Egbert L. W.
摘要：We study the extension of an EITC for single mothers in the Netherlands to mothers with a youngest child 12 to 15 years of age. This reform increased the net income gain of moving into employment for the treatment group by 31%. Using both DD and RD we show that this reform had a negligible effect on labour participation, with tight confidence intervals around zero. Our results are at odds with a number of related studies. This finding may be due to our treatment group of single mothers of whic...
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作者：Aldashev, Gani; Marini, Marco; Verdier, Thierry
作者单位：University of Namur; Sapienza University Rome; Institut Polytechnique de Paris; Ecole des Ponts ParisTech; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK
摘要：Mission-driven nonprofit organizations compete for donations through fundraising activities. Such competition can lead to inefficient outcomes, if nonprofits impose externalities on each others' output This paper studies the sustainability of fundraising coordination agreements, using a game-theoretic model of coalition formation. We show that three key characteristics determine the stability of cooperation between nonprofits: (i) the alliance formation rule, (ii) the extent to which fundraisi...
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作者：Clark, Robert L.; Morrill, Melinda Sandler; Vanderweide, David
作者单位：North Carolina State University; North Carolina State University
摘要：Studies examining pension distribution choices have found that the tendency of private-sector workers is to select lump sum distributions instead of life annuities resulting in leakage of retirement savings. In the public sector, defined benefit pensions usually offer lump sum distributions equal to employee contributions, not the present value of the annuity. Thus, for terminating employees that are younger or have shorter tenures, the lump sum distribution amount may exceed the present value...
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作者：Sobbrio, Francesco
作者单位：Catholic University of the Sacred Heart
摘要：This paper provides a model of the market for news where profit-maximizing media outlets choose their editors from a population of rational citizens. The analysis identifies a novel mechanism of media bias: the bias in a media outlet's news reports is the result of the slanted endogenous information acquisition strategy of its editor. In particular, the results show that the expected accuracy of news reports is lower the more ideological an editor is. Nevertheless, citizens find it optimal to ...
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作者：Gravel, Nicolas; Oddou, Remy
作者单位：Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Aix-Marseille Universite; Universite Paris Saclay
摘要：This paper examines the segregative properties of endogenous processes of jurisdiction formation in the presence of a competitive land market. In the considered model, a continuum of households with different income levels and the same preference for local public goods, private spending and housing choose a location from a finite set. Each location has an initial endowment of housing that is priced competitively and that belongs to absentee landlords. Each location is also endowed with a speci...
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作者：Cordis, Adriana S.; Warren, Patrick L.
作者单位：Winthrop University; Clemson University
摘要：We assess the effect of Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) laws on public corruption in the United States. Specifically, we investigate the impact of switching from a weak to a strong state-level FOIA law on corruption convictions of state and local government officials. The evidence suggests that strengthening FOIA laws has two offsetting effects: reducing corruption and increasing the probability that corrupt acts are detected. The conflation of these two effects led prior work to find little...
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作者：Kelly, Elaine; Rasul, Imran
作者单位：University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; University of London; University College London
摘要：We evaluate the impact of a policing experiment that depenalized the possession of small quantities of cannabis in the London borough of Lambeth, on hospital admissions related to illicit drug use. To do so, we exploit administrative records on individual hospital admissions classified by ICD-10 diagnosis codes. These records allow the construction of a quarterly panel data set for London boroughs running from 1997 to 2009 to estimate the short and long run impacts of the depenalization policy...
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作者：Vogl, Tom S.
作者单位：Princeton University
摘要：Elections between black and white candidates tend to involve close margins and high turnout. Using a novel dataset of municipal vote returns during the rise of black mayors in U.S. cities, this paper establishes new facts about turnout and competition in close interracial elections. In the South, but not the North, close black victories were more likely than close black losses, involved higher turnout than close black losses, and were more likely than close black losses to be followed by subse...
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作者：Koessler, Frederic; Lambert-Mogiliansky, Ariane
作者单位：Paris School of Economics; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)
摘要：We consider the problem faced by firms operating in a foreign country characterized by weak governance. Our focus is on extortion based on the threat of expropriation and bureaucratic harassment. The bureaucrat's bargaining power is characterized by a general extortion mechanism adapted from the optimal auction theory in Myerson (1981). This characterization is used to analyze the determinants of the quality of governance and whether and how this is improved by political-risk insurance. This i...
