Strategy-proof multi-object mechanism design: Ex-post revenue maximization with non-quasilinear preferences

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Kazumura, Tomoya; Mishra, Debasis; Serizawa, Shigehiro
• 署名单位: Institute of Science Tokyo; Tokyo Institute of Technology; Indian Statistical Institute; Indian Statistical Institute Delhi; University of Osaka
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2020.105036
• 发表日期: 2020
• 关键词: Multi-object auction; strategy-proofness; Ex-post revenue maximization; Minimum Walrasian equilibrium price mechanism; non-quasilinear preferences

摘要

A seller is selling multiple objects to a set of agents, who can buy at most one object. Each agent's preference over (object, payment) pairs need not be quasilinear. The seller considers the following desiderata for her mechanism, which she terms desirable: (1) strategy-proofness, (2) ex post individual rationality, (3) equal treatment of equals, (4) no wastage (every object is allocated to some agent). The minimum Walrasian equilibrium price (MWEP) mechanism is desirable. We show that at each preference profile, the MWEP mechanism generates more revenue for the seller than any desirable mechanism satisfying no subsidy. Our result works for the quasilinear domain, where the MWEP mechanism is the VCG mechanism, and for various non-quasilinear domains, some of which incorporate positive income effect of agents. We can relax no subsidy to no bankruptcy in our result for certain domains with positive income effect. (C) 2020 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Inc.