Journal of Economic Theory

最新文章

• Truthful aggregation of budget proposals AI翻译
  作者：Freeman, Rupert; Pennock, David M.; Peters, Dominik; Vaughan, Jennifer Wortman
  作者单位：University of Virginia; Rutgers University System; Rutgers University New Brunswick; Harvard University
  摘要：We consider a participatory budgeting problem in which each voter submits a proposal for how to divide a single divisible resource (such as money or time) among several possible alternatives (such as public projects or activities) and these proposals must be aggregated into a single aggregate division. Under l(1) preferences-for which a voter's disutility is given by the l(1) distance between the aggregate division and the division he or she most prefers-the social welfare-maximizing mechanism...
• A comparison of regret theory and salience theory for decisions under risk AI翻译
  作者：Herweg, Fabian; Mueller, Daniel
  作者单位：University of Bayreuth; Leibniz Association; Ifo Institut; University of Bayreuth; University of Wurzburg
  摘要：Two non-transitive theories to model decision making under risk are regret theory (Loomes and Sugden, 1982, 1987) and salience theory (Bordalo et al., 2012). While the psychological underpinning of these two approaches is different, the models share the assumption that within-state comparisons of outcomes across choice options are a key determinant of choice behavior. We investigate the overlap between these theories and show that original regret theory (Loomes and Sugden, 1982) is a special c...
• Multiple priors and comparative ignorance AI翻译
  作者：Kopylov, Igor
  作者单位：University of California System; University of California Irvine; University of California System; University of California Irvine
  摘要：Fox and Tversky (1995) observe comparative ignorance: people are more ambiguity averse when they evaluate ambiguous and clear prospects jointly rather than in isolation. To accommodate such patterns, I relax the multiple priors model and allow subjective sets of priors to depend on partitions that are generated by feasible prospects. All sets of priors are derived uniquely on the corresponding partitions. This model violates transitivity, but preserves all other axioms of Gilboa and Schmeidler...
• Belief hedges: Measuring ambiguity for all events and all models AI翻译
  作者：Baillon, Aurelien; Bleichrodt, Han; Li, Chen; Wakker, Peter P.
  作者单位：Erasmus University Rotterdam; Erasmus University Rotterdam - Excl Erasmus MC
  摘要：We introduce belief hedges, i.e., sets of events whose uncertain subjective beliefs neutralize each other. Belief hedges allow us to measure ambiguity attitudes without knowing those subjective beliefs. They lead to improved ambiguity indexes that are valid under all popular ambiguity theories. Our indexes can be applied to real-world problems and do not require expected utility for risk or commitments to two-stage optimization, thereby increasing their descriptive power. Belief hedges make am...
• Aggregation and design of information in asset markets with adverse selection AI翻译
  作者：Asriyan, Vladimir; Fuchs, William; Green, Brett
  作者单位：Pompeu Fabra University; Centre de Recerca en Economia Internacional (CREI); Barcelona School of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; Universidad Carlos III de Madrid; Washington University (WUSTL)
  摘要：How effectively does a decentralized marketplace aggregate information that is dispersed throughout the economy? We study this question in a dynamic setting where sellers have private information that is correlated with an unobservable aggregate state. In any equilibrium, each seller's trading behavior provides an informative and conditionally independent signal about the aggregate state. We ask whether the state is revealed as the number of informed traders grows large. Surprisingly, the answ...
• When voters like to be right: An analysis of the Condorcet Jury Theorem with mixed motives AI翻译
  作者：Midjord, Rune; Barraquer, Tomas Rodriguez; Valasek, Justin
  作者单位：Copenhagen Business School; Universidad de los Andes (Colombia); Norwegian School of Economics (NHH)
  摘要：We study the aggregation of private information through voting in committees where agents are rewarded based on both the correctness of the committee decision (instrumental payoffs) and the correctness of their vote (expressive payoffs). Surprisingly, we find that even when expressive payoffs are perfectly aligned with instrumental payoffs, expressive payoffs can prevent committees from aggregating private information, suggesting that committees will make better decisions if agents are not hel...
• Strategic disaggregation in matching markets AI翻译
  作者：Nei, Stephen; Pakzad-Hurson, Bobak
  作者单位：University of Exeter; Brown University
  摘要：Decisions agents make before and after matching can be strategically linked through the match. We demonstrate this linkage in a game where universities either require students to commit to majors before matriculating or allow students to pick majors during their studies. The interaction between matching forces (competition for higher quality students) and principal-agent forces (moral hazard and adverse selection) leads to two equilibria that mirror the admissions systems in the US and England...
• Asymptotic behavior of Bayesian learners with misspecified models AI翻译
  作者：Esponda, Ignacio; Pouzo, Demian; Yamamoto, Yuichi
  作者单位：University of California System; University of California Santa Barbara; University of California System; University of California Berkeley; Hitotsubashi University
  摘要：We consider an agent who represents uncertainty about the environment via a possibly misspecified model. Each period, the agent takes an action, observes a consequence, and uses Bayes' rule to update her belief about the environment. This framework has become increasingly popular in economics to study behavior driven by incorrect or biased beliefs. By first showing that the key element to predict the agent's behavior is the frequency of her past actions, we are able to characterize asymptotic ...
• Unforeseen evidence AI翻译
  作者：Piermont, Evan
  作者单位：University of London; Royal Holloway University London
  摘要：I propose a normative updating rule, extended Bayesianism, for the incorporation of probabilistic information arising from the process of becoming more aware. Extended Bayesianism generalizes standard Bayesian updating to allow the posterior to reside on richer probability space than the prior. I then provide a behavioral characterization of this rule to conclude that a decision maker's subjective expected utility beliefs are consistent with extended Bayesianism. (c) 2021 Elsevier Inc. All rig...
• Equilibrium behaviors in repeated games AI翻译
  作者：Li, Yingkai; Pei, Harry
  作者单位：Northwestern University; Northwestern University
  摘要：We examine a patient player's behavior when he can build reputations in front of a sequence of myopic opponents. With positive probability, the patient player is a commitment type who plays his Stackelberg action in every period. We characterize the patient player's action frequencies in equilibrium. Our results clarify the extent to which reputations can refine the patient player's behavior and provide new insights to entry deterrence, business transactions, and capital taxation. Our proof ma...