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作者：Bando, Keisuke; Hirai, Toshiyuki
作者单位：Shinshu University; Hosei University
摘要：We consider a multilateral matching market, where two or more agents can engage in a joint venture via multilateral contracts. Possible joint ventures are exogenously given. We study four stability concepts: stability, weak setwise stability, strong group stability, and setwise stability. We characterize the structure of possible joint ventures that guarantee the efficiency and existence of outcomes satisfying these stability concepts under general preference profiles. Specifically, we show th...
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作者：Cho, Myeonghwan
作者单位：University of Seoul
摘要：We consider a situation in which sellers and buyers trade divisible goods as price-takers in a network. We first characterize equilibrium market structures under which actual trading occurs through the links. Even when the sellers and buyers are connected in a network, several markets with different prices can appear in an equilibrium. The equilibrium market structure is essentially unique in the sense that each individual faces the same price and ends up with the same quantity traded in every...
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作者：van den Brink, Rene; Nunez, Marina; Robles, Francisco
作者单位：Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam; Tinbergen Institute; University of Barcelona
摘要：In two-sided assignment markets with transferable utility, we first introduce two weak monotonicity properties that are compatible with stability. We show that for a fixed population, the sellers-optimal(respectively the buyers-optimal) stable rules are the only stable rules that satisfy object-valuation antimonotonicity( respectively buyer-valuation monotonicity). Essential in these properties is that, after a change in valuations, monotonicity is required only for buyers that stay matched wi...
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作者：Lipnowski, Elliot; Ravid, Doron
作者单位：Columbia University; University of Chicago
摘要：We study optimal testing to inform quarantine decisions for a population exhibiting a heterogeneous probability of carrying a pathogen. Because test supply is limited, the planner may choose to test a pooled sample, which contains the specimens of multiple individuals (Dorfman, 1943). We characterize the unique optimal allocation of tests. This allocation features assortative batching, whereby agents of differing infection risk are never jointly tested. Moreover, the planner tests only individ...
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作者：Adam, Klaus; Woodford, Michael
作者单位：University of Mannheim; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; Columbia University; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：We analytically characterize optimal monetary policy for an augmented New Keynesian model with a housing sector. With rational private sector expectations about housing prices and inflation, optimal monetary policy can be characterized by a standard 'target criterion' that refers to inflation and the output gap, without making reference to housing prices. When the policymaker is concerned with potential departures of private sector expectations from rational ones and seeks a policy that is rob...
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作者：Mensch, Jeffrey
作者单位：Hebrew University of Jerusalem
摘要：This paper explores the connection between rational inattention and the monotone likelihood ratio prop-erty (MLRP). In many economic problems, agents prefer to take a higher action when there is a higher underlying state. It is often assumed that these agents have noisy signals that are strongly correlated with the underlying state, i.e. ordered by the MLRP. Separately, a large literature has recently explored the be-havior of rationally inattentive agents. Under some common separability and s...
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作者：Landry, Peter; Webb, Ryan
作者单位：University of Toronto; University of Toronto; University Toronto Mississauga; University of Toronto
摘要：We present a theory of multi-attribute choice founded in the neuroscience of perception. Valuation is formed through a series of pairwise, attribute-level comparisons implemented by (divisive) normalization ? a form of relative value coding observed across sensory modalities and in species ranging from honeybees to humans. Such ?pairwise normalization? captures a broad range of behavioral regularities in multi-attribute choice, including the compromise and asymmetric dominance effects, the div...
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作者：Lackner, Martin; Skowron, Piotr
作者单位：Technische Universitat Wien; University of Warsaw
摘要：This paper is an axiomatic study of consistent approval-based committee (ABC) rules. These are multi-winner voting rules that select a committee, i.e., a fixed-size group of candidates, based on approval ballots. We introduce the class of ABC scoring rules and provide an axiomatic characterization of this class based on the consistency axiom. Building upon this result, we axiomatically characterize three important consistent multi-winner rules: Proportional Approval Voting, Multi-Winner Approv...
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作者：Stachurski, John; Zhang, Junnan
作者单位：Australian National University
摘要：This paper extends the core results of discrete time infinite horizon dynamic programming to the case of state-dependent discounting. We obtain a condition on the discount factor process under which all of the standard optimality results can be recovered. We also show that the condition cannot be significantly weakened. Our framework is general enough to handle complications such as recursive preferences and unbounded rewards. Economic and financial applications are discussed. (C) 2021 Elsevie...
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作者：Elliott, Matthew; Georg, Co-Pierre; Hazell, Jonathon
作者单位：University of Cambridge; University of Cape Town; Deutsche Bundesbank
摘要：Banks face different but potentially correlated risks from outside the financial system. Financial connections can share these risks, but they also create the means by which shocks can be propagated. We examine this tradeoff in the context of a new stylized fact we present: German banks are more likely to have financial connections when they face more similar risks. We develop a model that can rationalize such behavior. We argue that such patterns are socially suboptimal and raise systemic ris...
