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作者：Pram, Kym
作者单位：Nevada System of Higher Education (NSHE); University of Nevada Reno
摘要：I consider a broad class of economic environments where a principal contracts with an agent under adverse selection and the agent can credibly disclose information to the principal. I show that there is an equilibrium that interim Pareto dominates the equilibrium without evidence if and only if the optimal mechanism without evidence assigns the outside option to a set of types satisfying a 'gains from trade' property. The results apply to a range of economic environments including insurance ma...
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作者：Van Essen, Matt; Wooders, John
作者单位：University of Tennessee System; University of Tennessee Knoxville; New York University; New York University Abu Dhabi
摘要：We study the problem of fairly allocating heterogenous items, priorities, positions, or property rights to participants with equal claims from three perspectives: cooperative, decision theoretic, and non-cooperative. We characterize the Shapley value of the cooperative game and then introduce a class of auctions for non-cooperatively allocating positions. We show that for any auction in this class, each bidder obtains his Shapley value when every bidder follows the auction's unique maxmin perf...
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作者：Battigalli, Pierpaolo; De Vito, Nicodemo
作者单位：Bocconi University; Bocconi University
摘要：We adopt the epistemic framework of Battigalli and Siniscalchi (1999) to model the distinction between a player's behavior at each node, which is part of the external state, and his plan, which is described by his beliefs about his own behavior. This allows us to distinguish between intentional and unintentional behavior, and to explicitly model how players revise their beliefs about the intentions of others upon observing their actions. Rational players plan optimally and their behavior is co...
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作者：Marlats, Chantal; Menager, Lucie
作者单位：Universite Paris-Pantheon-Assas
摘要：We introduce strategic observation into Keller et al. (2005)'s game of experimentation with conclusive breakthroughs. There are two players who must decide when to start and when to stop observation, given that observation is costly and stopping observation is irreversible. We construct a class of symmetric Markov Perfect Equilibria in which, on path, players fully experiment before starting observation, and allocate only a fraction of the resource to the risky arm afterwards. Each equilibrium...
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作者：Krasikov, Ilia; Lamba, Rohit
作者单位：HSE University (National Research University Higher School of Economics); Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park
摘要：Financial constraints preclude many surplus producing economic transactions, and inhibit the growth of many others. This paper models financial constraints as the interaction of two forces: the agent has persistent private information and is strapped for cash. The wedge between the optimal and efficient allocation, termed distortion, increases over time with each successive bad shock and decreases with each good shock. At any point in the contract, an endogenous number of good shocks are requi...
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作者：Horan, Sean
作者单位：Universite de Montreal; Universite de Montreal
摘要：In the late 1950's, Luce developed two theories of imperfect utility discrimination that have had a lasting effect on economics. The first (1956) initiated the literature on incomplete preferences while the second (1959) laid the foundations for the literature on discrete choice. I propose a general model of utility discrimination that unifies Luce's two theories while addressing the main limitations of each. I show that two conditions from Luce's (1959) monograph characterize behavior consist...
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作者：Artemov, Georgy
作者单位：University of Melbourne
摘要：I study costly information acquisition in a two-sided matching problem, such as matching applicants to schools. An applicant's utility is a sum of common and idiosyncratic components. The idiosyncratic component is unknown to the applicant but can be learned at a cost. As applicants learn, their preferences over schools become more heterogeneous, improving match quality. In my stylized environment, too few applicants acquire information in an ordinal strategy-proof mechanism. Subsidies, disclo...
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作者：Brandl, Florian
作者单位：University of Bonn
摘要：We consider social welfare functions when the preferences of individual agents and society maximize subjective expected utility in the tradition of Savage. A system of axioms is introduced whose unique solution is the social welfare function that averages the agents' beliefs and sums up their utility functions, normalized to have the same range. The first distinguishing axiom requires positive association of society's preferences with the agents' preferences for acts about which beliefs agree....
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作者：Menicucci, Domenico
作者单位：University of Florence
摘要：A widespread claim in the auction literature about the most well known auction setting with i.i.d. private values is that the optimal reserve price for a second price auction is independent of the number n of bidders. This is indeed the case if the virtual valuation function is increasing, but this result fails to hold if the virtual valuation is non-monotone. In such case the optimal reserve price is weakly increasing in n and, as n tends to infinity, it tends to the highest regular valuation...
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作者：Mauersberger, Felix
作者单位：University of Bonn
摘要：This paper introduces a learning-to-forecast laboratory experiment based on a New-Keynesian macroeconomy that is particularly close to the model's microfoundations. In this setup, subjects forecast their individual optimal consumption and prices instead of aggregate outcomes. Due to different personal experiences, coordination of forecasting behavior does not occur naturally, and there is considerable randomness in subjects' responses. Thompson Sampling, a learning heuristic from operations re...
