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作者：Gieczewski, German
作者单位：Princeton University
摘要：This paper models a war of attrition that evolves over time. Two players fight over a prize until one surrenders. The flow costs of fighting depend on a state variable that is public but changes stochastically as the war unfolds. In the unique equilibrium, each player surrenders when the state becomes adverse enough; for intermediate states, both players fight on. In an extension, the baseline model is augmented to allow for unilateral concessions of part of the prize. Such concessions can be ...
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作者：Akoz, Kemal Kivanc; Samsonov, Arseniy
作者单位：HSE University (National Research University Higher School of Economics); Ozyegin University
摘要：We define a (cooperative) informational bargaining problem, where several agents have to agree on the persuasion of a receiver. The bargaining set includes payoff vectors that can be generated by information structures and disagreement leads to an exogenous benchmark that may involve full or no information. We characterize the existence of an agreement that benefits all agents when preferences are state-independent. Our characterization yields conditions that depend only on the payoff structur...
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作者：Bhardwaj, Bhavook; Manocha, Kriti
作者单位：Universita Ca Foscari Venezia
摘要：This paper introduces a model of decision making based on a procedure of rejection. Departing from the standard model of choice via preference maximization, the decision maker (DM) in our model rejects minimal alternatives from a menu according to a binary relation. We axiomatically study the correspondence of non-rejected alternatives with different rationality conditions on the underlying binary relation. We then generalize our model to study correspondences generated by an iterative procedu...
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作者：Dogan, Battal; Imamura, Kenzo; Yenmez, M. Bumin
作者单位：University of Bristol; University of Tokyo; Washington University (WUSTL); Durham University
摘要：In matching markets, policymakers often pursue complex distributional objectives, such as promoting diversity in student populations. To this end, they embed these objectives into the choice rules of institutions, such as schools, and implement the deferred-acceptance (DA) mechanism based on those rules. Given the institutional choice rules, we introduce a method for characterizing the corresponding DA mechanism through the properties of these choice rules. Utilizing this method, we derive nov...
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作者：Head, Allen; Kam, Timothy; Ng, Sam; Pan, Guangqian
作者单位：Queens University - Canada; Australian National University; University of Macau; University of Sydney
摘要：We develop a monetary economy in which banks have market power emanating from search frictions. Distributions of both deposit and loan interest rates are equilibrium phenomena exhibiting dispersion consistent with new micro-level evidence on U.S. consumer loans and deposits. The theory accounts for incomplete pass-through of monetary policy to the distributions of loan and deposit rates through a novel channel. Imperfect competition links monetary policy to real consumption and welfare through...
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作者：Nishimura, Kazuo; Pelgrin, Florian; Venditti, Alain
作者单位：Kobe University; Universite Catholique de Lille; EDHEC Business School; Aix-Marseille Universite; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)
摘要：This paper introduces a novel mechanism driving endogenous business cycle fluctuations within a frictionless three-sector intertemporal equilibrium model. We emphasize the critical role of consumer preferences as a primary driver of cyclical dynamics by considering a consumption bundle composed of a pure consumption good and a mixed consumption-investment good that simultaneously serves as both a final consumption good and a capital-accumulating investment good. Endogenous fluctuations natural...
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作者：Turansick, Christopher
作者单位：Bocconi University; Bocconi University
摘要：We readdress the problem of nonparametric statistical testing of random utility models proposed in Kitamura and Stoye (2018). Although their test is elegant, it is subject to computational constraints which leaves execution of the test infeasible in many applications. We note that much of the computational burden in Kitamura and Stoye's test is due to their test defining a polyhedral cone through its vertices rather than its faces. We propose an alternative but equivalent hypothesis test for r...
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作者：Sato, Hiroto; Shimizu, Konan
作者单位：Nagoya University; Keio University
摘要：This study extends Blackwell (1953) comparison of information to a sequential social learning model in which agents make decisions sequentially based on both private signals and observed actions of others. In this context, we introduce a binary relation over information structures: an information structure is more socially valuable than another if it yields higher expected payoffs for all agents, regardless of their preferences and equilibrium realizations. First, we establish that this binary...
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作者：Mononen, Lasse
作者单位：University of Bielefeld
摘要：Complexity aversion in choice under risk is well documented. One of its main behavioral effects is the event-splitting effect. It captures how the value of a lottery changes when one prize is split into two prizes, each with half the original probability. We weaken independence and continuity to accommodate the event-splitting effect. The resulting preferences admit either an expected utility representation with an additive entropy cost of complexity or a power-weighted expected utility repres...
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作者：Cheng, Xienan; Borgers, Tilman
作者单位：Peking University; University of Michigan System; University of Michigan
摘要：We introduce a theory of dominance that encompasses as special cases the theory of admissible decision procedures in statistics, strict and weak dominance among strategies in games, first or second-order stochastic dominance among monetary lotteries, and Pareto dominance among social alternatives. One choice dominates another if in a variety of situations the former choice yields higher expected utility than the latter. We show that under certain assumptions, which include most importantly con...
