Market design with distributional objectives: Efficiency, incentives, and property rights

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Hafalir, Isa E.; Kojima, Fuhito; Yenmez, M. Bumin
• 署名单位: University of Technology Sydney; University of Tokyo; Washington University (WUSTL); Durham University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2025.106099
• 发表日期: 2025
• 关键词: School choice; constraints; allocation; STABILITY

摘要

Given an initial matching and a policy objective on the distribution of agent types to institutions, we study the existence of a mechanism that weakly improves the distributional objective and satisfies constrained efficiency, individual rationality, and strategy-proofness. Such a mechanism need not exist in general. We introduce a new notion of discrete concavity, which we call pseudo M#-concavity, and construct a mechanism with the desirable properties when the distributional objective satisfies this notion. We provide several practically relevant distributional objectives that are pseudo M#-concave.