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作者：Decerf, Benoit; Van der Linden, Martin
作者单位：The World Bank; Emory University
摘要：We compare the manipulability of school choice mechanisms based on the occurrence of dominant strate-gies. We characterize dominant strategies in the constrained versions of the deferred acceptance (DA) and Boston (BOS) mechanisms. We leverage our characterizations to show that dominant strategies occur more often in constrained DA than in constrained BOS and that these differences can be quantitatively sizable. Dominant strategies also become more frequent in constrained DA as students are al...
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作者：Amarante, Massimiliano; Ghossoub, Mario
作者单位：Universite de Montreal; Universite de Montreal; University of Waterloo
摘要：A ranking greater than or similar to over a set of alternatives is an aggregation of experts' opinions (AEO) if it depends on the experts' assessments only. We study both those rankings that result from pooling Bayesian experts and those that result from pooling possibly non-Bayesian experts. In the non-Bayesian case, we allow for the simultaneous presence of experts that may display very different attitudes toward uncertainty. We show that a unique axiom along with a mild regularity condition...
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作者：Carroll, D. Christopher; Holm, B. Martin; Kimball, S. Miles
作者单位：Johns Hopkins University; University of Oslo; University of Colorado System; University of Colorado Boulder
摘要：We provide the analytical explanation of the interactions between precautionary saving and liquidity constraints. The effects of liquidity constraints and risks are similar because both stem from the same source: a concavification of the consumption function. Since a more concave consumption function exhibits heightened prudence, both constraints and risks strengthen the precautionary saving motive. In addition, we explain the apparently contradictory results that constraints and risks in some...
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作者：Edmond, Chris; Lu, Yang K.
作者单位：University of Melbourne; Hong Kong University of Science & Technology
摘要：We develop a model in which a politician seeks to prevent a group of citizens from making informed decisions. The politician can manipulate information at a cost. The citizens are rational and internalize the politician's incentives. In the unique equilibrium of the game, the citizens' beliefs are unbiased but endogenously noisy. We interpret the social media revolution as a shock that simultaneously (i) improves the underlying, intrinsic precision of the citizens' information, but also (ii) r...
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作者：Long, Yan; Sethuraman, Jay; Xue, Jingyi
作者单位：Huazhong University of Science & Technology; Columbia University; Singapore Management University
摘要：A group of agents have uncertain needs on a resource, which must be allocated before uncertainty re-solves. We propose a parametric class of division rules we call equal-quantile rules. The parameter lambda of an equal-quantile rule is the maximal probability of satiation imposed on agents - for each agent, the prob-ability that his assignment is no less than his realized need is at most lambda. It determines the extent to which the resource should be used to satiate agents. If the resource is...
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作者：Ghosh, Gagan; Liu, Heng
作者单位：California State University System; California State University Fullerton; University of Michigan System; University of Michigan
摘要：This paper studies sequential auctions in the presence of ambiguity about the distribution of values. Using the multi-self approach to accommodate the possible time inconsistency that arises with dynamic bidding for maxmin bidders, we characterize the unique symmetric and monotone equilibrium in closed form. We show that the equilibrium prices are a supermartingale if the worst-case beliefs reverse hazard rate dom-inate the true distribution of values, providing an explanation for the well-doc...
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作者：Chang, Dongkyu
作者单位：City University of Hong Kong
摘要：This paper studies the optimal design of sales mechanisms when a buyer can quit a negotiation for an outside option at any time. The main results show that the profit-maximizing mechanism induces a set of buyer types to delay purchasing a good if the value of the outside option is highly dispersed among buyer types. Moreover, to prevent a buyer from quitting a negotiation, the profit-maximizing mechanism also features an upfront payment, which is compensated later by a price discount. The sell...
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作者：Cui, Zhiwei; Weidenholzer, Simon
作者单位：Beihang University; Beihang University; University of Essex
摘要：We consider a model of social coordination and network formation where agents decide on an action in a coordination game and on whom to establish costly links to. We study the role of passive connections; these are links that other agents form to a given agent. Such passive connections may create an endogenously arising form of lock-in where agents don't switch actions and links, as this may result in a loss of payoff received through them. When agents are constrained in the number of links th...
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作者：Eliaz, Kfir; Spiegler, Ran; Thysen, Heidi C.
作者单位：Tel Aviv University; Utah System of Higher Education; University of Utah; University of London; University College London; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
摘要：We study strategic communication when the sender's multi-dimensional messages are given an interpretation by the sender himself or by a proxy. Interpreting messages involves the provision of some data about their statistical state-dependence. Interpretation can be selective: different kinds of data interpret different sets of message components. The receiver uses this data to decipher messages, yet he does not draw any inferences from the kind of data he is given. In this way, strategic interp...
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作者：Spiegler, Ran
作者单位：Tel Aviv University; University of London; University College London
摘要：I present an approach to static equilibrium modeling with non-rational expectations, which is based on enriching players' typology. A player is characterized by his data access, consisting of: (i) news access, which corresponds to a conventional signal in the Harsanyi model, and (ii) archival access, a novel component representing the player's piecemeal knowledge of steady-state correlations. Drawing on prior literature on correlation neglect and coarse reasoning, I assume the player extrapola...
